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A large portion of decision analysis lies in a decision maker’s uncertainty about an 
outcome and what they perceive is the chance (probability) of that outcome occurring (in 
other words, an individual’s “degree of belief” that an outcome will occur).   However, 
thinking probabilistically can be difficult and we rely on “rather primitive cognitive 
techniques to make” such assessments (these techniques are termed heuristics) (Clemen & 
Reilly, 2001 p.311).   Heuristics are simple and intuitive but tend to result in probabilities 
that are biased.   This thesis will connect the literature available from both the psychology 
 vii
 behind the biases and the mathematical problems associated with the probability elicitation 
itself.  Additionally, this thesis will present a better understanding of the biases that distort 
the probability elicitation for the decision maker along with suggestions for improving 
such assessments.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
The overall process of arriving at an informed decision, that is at present a best 
value, is often a long and tedious process that can consist of multiple quantitative and 
qualitative values, varying degrees of uncertainty associated with the likelihood of events, 
and differing opinions from various people concerning what is most important about the 
decision at hand. Decision analysis exists to assist a decision maker in choosing the best 
option available with decisions that exhibit such difficulty. This thesis will focus on the 
uncertainty aspect of decision analysis and specifically the biases that are associated with 
probability assessment, methods used for eliciting uncertainty from an individual with 
knowledge of a specific field, and ways to improve the assessments provided.  
Probability elicitation is not a strictly academic situation.  Many documented 
instances exist where decision makers have had to use probabilities assessed by experts to 
make a proper decision. Chapter two reviews some of these real life decisions that were 
made with decision analysis that incorporate the use of probability assessments from 
subject matter experts. 
There are a wide variety of biases that may be brought about with the probability 
assessments provided by a subject matter expert. These biases can be produced 
purposefully for motivational reasons or as a simple cognitive misjudgment. In general, 
humans have developed two separate means of drawing conclusions from data: a reasoning 
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 ability for processing mental representations, and a judgmental ability for characterizing 
stimuli along key dimensions (Benson et al, 1995). Wallsten and Budescu (1983) postulate 
that when a subject is asked to provide a probability of an event’s occurrence, the 
individual will search their memory for applicable knowledge, combine that knowledge 
with the information at hand, and attempt to provide the best feasible judgment. Therefore, 
the judgment provided depends on the subject’s memory, the current information aspects, 
and also the order in which the subject generally processes information. Gigerenzer et al 
(1991) presents literature suggesting that memory is “excellent in storing frequency 
information from various environments and the registering of event occurrences for 
frequency judgments is fairly automatic cognitive process requiring very little attention or 
conscious effort” (p.510). This series of cognitive processes that occur without effort in the 
subject leaves much room for error of interpretation of uncertainty and that error can be 
presented as a biased assessment. This thesis will review several biases including some 
that are associated with the cognitive processes termed heuristics. “Heuristics are 
essentially informal arguments employed by subjects in bringing evidence to bear upon the 
propositions in question” (Benson et al, 1995 p.1641).  
 A main goal of probability elicitation is to avoid any biases (or adjust those that 
surface) that will present themselves due either to heuristics or motivational purposes. 
Thus, proper probability elicitation methods are reviewed in chapter four that will 
hopefully minimize any biases that could present themselves and create havoc on the 
uncertainty aspect of the problem itself. Training the experts to recognize biases associated 
with cognitive processes is a preferred method for avoiding them entirely.  For the few 
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 biases not avoided with a proper elicitation procedure, chapter five reviews methodology 
for improving expert probability assessments. These methods may also be used during the 
elicitation process and they work not only to eliminate biases but also to improve the 
probability assessments so that a more accurate and better decision can be made. Often 
times, a motivational bias can work its way into the subject’s psyche presenting inaccurate 
assessments that can be damaging to the integrity of the decision. The final chapter, 
Scoring Rules, reviews how scoring rules can be used to encourage honesty in forecasting.  
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CHAPTER 2 Applications of Probability Elicitation 
 
 There are many major decisions that are made based on probability assessments 
which are supplied from subject matter experts.  There are a variety of ways to elicit these 
expert judgments and many fields of study have already performed these procedures and 
analyzed subsequent expert probability assessments to arrive at better decisions.  Five 
studies will be covered that had to perform an elicitation procedure to extract probabilities 
or probability distributions from experts in a given field.  North and Stengel (1982) 
brought to the surface a methodology for major decisions in the development of magnetic 
fusion energy. Keeney, Sarin, and Winkler (1984) developed a risk assessment model to 
relate adverse health effects to alternative carbon monoxide standards. Winkler and Poses 
(1993) presented a probability analysis on the survivability of intensive care unit patients. 
DeWispelare, Herren, and Clemen (1995) were concerned with acquiring accurate 
probabilistic judgments for future conditions at a high-level nuclear waste repository. 
Lastly, a decision analysis model, incorporating risk aversion and probabilistic 
dependence, for bidding oil and gas lease sales was provided by Donald Keefer (1991). 
 The U.S. magnetic fusion program was looking for a way to provide an 
inexhaustible energy supply within the next century (North & Stengel, 1982).  North and 
Stengel (1982) present the problem of deciding what facility to fund for the U.S. magnetic 
fusion energy program. This problem is plagued by uncertain strategic outcomes, vague 
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 available alternatives, and successes that are not measured in simple terms.  Because this is 
a long-term program, it naturally involves multiple decisions and to keep the analysis cost 
to a minimum, only a critical decision (and a subset of crucial decisions) were processed.  
The set of critical and crucial decisions encompass the building timeframe and the nature 
of the major test facilities.  The test facility decision comes with a considerable number of 
uncertainties to include commercial reactor performance, environmental concerns, time 
considerations, and commercial market acceptance.  To maintain a workable model some 
assumptions involving performance, cost and feasibility were made. 
 In the North and Stengel (1982) study, the following probabilities needed to be 
assessed in order to complete the decision tree: probability of commercialization of the 
leading fusion concept; probability of distribution over five-year increments; probability of 
distribution on the status of competing electric energy technologies; and the probability 
distribution on magnetic fusion reactor performance for each concept. The type of analysis 
that was being performed required a probability value, any and all of the above mentioned, 
be assigned to each path option in their influence diagram structure.  North and Stengel 
were aware of the conscious and unconscious biases that can surface with the probability 
elicitation process.  They referenced the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) when 
developing their interview process.  The probability assessments were created in two 
interviews with staff members knowledgeable in fusion research and program planning.  
Each interview, meant to develop a complete set of probability inputs for the decision tree 
analysis, was approximately three hours in length and incorporated a process that helped 
avoid biases.   
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  A final optimal result was not reached due to the usage of illustrative data that was 
not based on a thorough consultation with energy experts.  However, several tendencies in 
the outcome suggested that nominal development of the systems was slightly better than 
the accelerated option and the delay option.  North and Stengel (1982) conclude that the 
systematic assessment of performance, cost, and time of commercial availability, built up 
from engineering judgment, is the strongpoint of the methodology. 
 Keeney, Sarin, and Winkler (1984) offered an analysis that addressed the 
“complexities inherent to ambient air quality standard-setting problems” by developing a risk 
assessment model that relates adverse health effects to alternative carbon monoxide standards 
(p.518).  Keeney et al implement an individual interviewing process for multiple scientists to 
avoid any cognitive biases involving dependence.  
 Three major and five minor health effects were identified as resultants of CO exposure 
in the Keeney et al study. The overall problem of determining the number of people that would 
suffer from the health effects (and the magnitude of suffering) based on each alternative CO 
standard is too complex a problem to solve without decomposition.  Because experimentation 
was not a viable approach due to ethical consideration, professional judgments on estimates of 
health risks from CO exposure were obtained by interviewing numerous medical and health 
experts.  A representative sampling of experts were individually interviewed on multiple 
occasions, either in person or over the phone, with time lengths ranging from 30 minutes to 
two hours. Each expert was interviewed individually to attempt to preserve independence of 
opinion.  In each interview, the experts were asked for a qualitative identification of health 
effects and its corresponding probability.  The same information was elicited from different 
perspectives to allow for any inconsistencies and redundancy of information.  The fractile 
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 method and direct probability assessments were used to quantify the probability distributions. 
The fractile method is an assessment procedure where a value (e.g. ‘x’) is adjusted until an 
indifference point between lotteries is reached by the subject for a particular percentile (e.g. 
0.35). Thus the value (x) at that indifference point is the fractile of the distribution (i.e. x is the 
0.35 fractile of the distribution) (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). It was noted that like most 
assessment procedures, the experts were reluctant at first to quantify their judgments but 
became more willing throughout the course of the process.  Overall, the responses revealed 
substantial stability and consistency.   
 In an attempt to estimate health risks associated with variable CO levels, the 
methodology in the study by Keeney et al was applied to four cities with varying magnitudes 
of risk, response estimates, and exposure rates.  The relative values across the standards did not 
vary as greatly suggesting that “the relative ordering of standards in terms of risk estimates 
may not change with the refinements in exposure data” (Keeney et al, 1984 p.527). Lastly, 
although the individual interviews provided good estimates, an expert group meeting could 
have proven beneficial. 
  Winkler and Poses (1993) surmise that a physician assessed probability of survival 
can be of interest to the patient or another physician making a prognosis or decision regarding 
treatment. Their article analyzes “data from an observational study in which physicians with 
different levels of experience in critical care medicine and different familiarity with the patient 
assess the probability that a patient admitted to an intensive care unit in a teaching hospital 
would survive until discharge from the hospital” (Winkler & Poses, 1993).  The intent of the 
paper is to present an extensive analysis of both assessed probabilities and combination 
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 probabilities by evaluating the ability of the physicians to assess probabilities of survival of 
ICU patients.   
 Quantitative probability assessments of the patient’s survival were obtained as soon as 
possible (usually within an hour) after admittance from four physicians: an intern (the least 
experienced), the critical care fellow (three years post MD training), the critical care attending 
physician (five years post MD training), and the primary physician. No training or feedback 
was provided to the physicians except the critical care attending physicians.  The critical care 
attendings were the only group to know of the study’s purpose and thus maintain awareness in 
probabilistic judgment.  Each physician saw a differing number of patients because the study 
involved actual patients admitted to an ICU, and ICU staffing patterns are variable. An overall 
evaluation was done in addition to looking at a number of individual quality measures 
including the distributions of probabilities and outcomes, summary measure of such 
distributions, and decompositions of scoring rules.  A quadratic scoring rule called the Brier 
score was used for the overall evaluation as it integrates discrimination and calibration and is 
influenced by the base rate (scoring rules will be defined in chapter 6). As for the distributions 
of probability assessments, the primaries gave extremely high probabilities much more often 
than the others (with a relatively low number in the middle sections), the critical care 
attendings seldom used extremely high probabilities but used the middle sections much more 
often, and the interns and critical care fellows tended to be in between the two extremes.  
Lastly, the primaries were particularly good at identifying patients who would survive.  A 
regression was run to determine if a model using the probabilities could improve upon the 
physician’s performance. The outcome provided hardly any change in the Brier scores, 
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 suggesting that any patterns in the data that might be capitalized on to improve assessment 
were very minor.  
 The general concept of getting additional information is to get to a better decision.  
Additionally, obtaining multiple forecasts and combining them leads to improved forecasting 
performance. The best combination was the primary physician and the critical care attending.  
In general, “the worst combination of two probabilities does better than the average of the four 
individual Brier scores, and the combination of all four probabilities does better than the best 
individual Brier score. Thus, obtaining additional opinions not only leads to improved 
performance on average, but results in reductions in the risk of poor performance” (Winkler & 
Poses, 1993 p.1534). These results were based on simple averages of probabilities.   
 The analysis showed that the physicians most familiar with the patient and most 
familiar with intensive care were the best performers, individually and in combination. Some 
biases could have affected the assessments including ego bias which could lead to higher 
assessments for a desirable outcome (like survival), hanging crepe bias where lower 
assessments are given so not to raise hopes, and uncertainty bias where the physicians are 
inclined to express their uncertainty by using less extreme probabilities.  Winkler and Poses 
recommend that some improvements in assessment might be reached by providing training on 
probability assessment, providing feedback on performance, having the physicians assess 
probabilities on a regular basis for experience, and having a group probability be presented 
after a collaboration of physicians. 
 The performances of high-level nuclear waste geologic repositories have to be 
assessed for a 10000 year regulatory period as stipulated by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) (DeWispelare et al, 1995).  Specifically, the study presented by 
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 DeWispelare, Herren, and Clemen (1995) was concerned with acquiring probabilistic 
judgment through expert elicitation of future climate parameters in the Yucca Mountain 
Nevada vicinity (YMNV).  
 The formal elicitation procedure used for this DeWispelare et al (1995) study 
consisted of eleven steps: determine the objectives and goals of the study; recruit the 
experts; identify issues and information needs; provide initial data to the experts; conduct 
the elicitation training session; discuss and refine the issues; provide a multi-week study 
period; conduct the elicitations; provide post-elicitation feedback to the experts; aggregate 
the experts’ judgments (if required); and document the process.  The eleven steps were 
then broken into five strictly sequential phases: pre-training activities (steps one through 
four); training (step five); study period (steps six through seven); elicitation (step eight); 
and follow-up (steps nine through eleven). The intent of the training process was to 
provide the experts with knowledge of potential biases that can be encountered during the 
elicitation process. The discussion process should be used by the experts to refine the 
initial conceptual scenarios to arrive at an unambiguous definition of the events to be 
elicited and result in a convenient model that they can proceed with into individual 
research efforts.  Individual elicitations were conducted by having each expert prepare a 
document that provided the basis of their judgments, bringing them together into a 
common meeting and presenting each paper to the group for clarification and reasoning of 
assessments, and then interviewing each individual afterwards to obtain probabilities.  The 
experts then reviewed the results to ensure that they accurately reflected the information 
provided in the elicitation. 
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  As for the aggregation of expert judgments, “aggregating judgments across a group 
of experts provides a distribution that attempts to summarize the state of knowledge across 
the group” (DeWispelare et al, 1995 p.18).  The two ways of aggregating the judgments of 
experts are behavioral, when the experts themselves produce a combined or consensus 
view or mechanical, when a central analyst is responsible for the aggregation by applying 
an aggregation formula.   
 DeWispelare et al make some concluding remarks of the documentation needs and 
general comments on the study including information from the experts themselves. “Expert 
judgments, elicited through a formal expert elicitation process, will be scrutable and the 
rationales used to reach the judgments will be documented” (DeWispelare et al, 1995 
p.21).  The experts felt that the training session to make aware the potential biases involved 
was essential, and that they had little difficulty in representing their judgments as 
probability distributions.  The consensus distributions that were generated behaviorally 
were not necessarily similar to the ones generated from mechanical combination 
techniques.  It is the responsibility of the decision maker to determine if and how to 
combine the individual distributions.  Finally, the mechanical aggregation of the individual 
expert judgments is an efficient, feasible, and appropriate way to satisfy the needs of 
modelers (DeWispelare et al, 1995).   
 “Bidding for offshore U.S. oil and gas leases is a major corporate resource allocation 
problem involving enormous uncertainties and very high stakes” (Keefer, 1991 p.377). Donald 
Keefer (1991) developed operationally useful decision analysis models that incorporate risk 
aversion and probabilistic dependence among the lease values for bidding at oil and gas 
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 lease sales in his article. This paper considers three expected utility models that use 
exponential utility functions and include both bids and partnership shares as potential 
decision variables. Probability elicitation is needed for this study to determine the certainty 
equivalents of the increasing levels of risk aversion for each of the three models presented.   
Thanks to the documentation of several decision studies that were performed, we 
can see that probability elicitation from experts is indeed a widely used method for 
combating uncertainty in a problem.  Unfortunately, there are many biases that are usually 
associated with the probability elicitation process.  The main biases that are present in most 
elicitation procedures are discussed in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3 The Problem: Heuristics and Biases 
 
 As previously noted, people have a tendency to incorporate both conscious and 
unconscious biases into their predictions of uncertainty.  A valid reason for this is that we, 
as humans, tend to use rather “primitive cognitive techniques” termed heuristics to assess 
uncertainty (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). Clemen and Reilly (2001) stated that “heuristics are 
easy and intuitive ways to deal with uncertain situations, but they tend to result in 
probability assessments that are biased in different ways depending on the heuristic used” 
(p.311).  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) define three heuristics that are used to assess 
probabilities and their associated biases. The three heuristics are representativeness, 
availability, and anchoring and adjusting.  There are additional biases that have been 
observed and are not specific to the proposed heuristics. There are a lot of instances where 
these heuristics and biases have been observed.  
 The representative heuristic is assessing a probability that someone or something 
belongs to a specific category (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).  More generally it is the method in 
which probabilities are evaluated “by the degree to which A is representative of B, that is, 
the degree to which A resembles B” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 p.1124).  This heuristic 
involves making the judgment by comparing the information provided on the subject with 
a stereotypical member of the category.  The better the resemblance between the two, the 
higher the probability is that the subject will be placed into the category. There are a 
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 multitude of biases that result from the representative heuristic: base rate bias, prior 
probability bias, insensitivity to sample size, incorrect interpretation of randomness, 
insensitivity to predictability, illusion of validity, and failure to regress.  
 The prior probability, or base-rate frequency, of an outcome is often neglected 
when people evaluate probability with representativeness.  The base-rate should have an 
effect on the probability assessment but is often overlooked.  To illustrate this concept 
consider the example of Tom W from Kahneman and Tversky (1973), whereby a 
description of Tom is provided that implies he is introverted, mechanically minded, 
lacking in creativity, and well organized. This description is given to a group of people so 
that they may assess the likelihood that Tom is a graduate student in various academic 
fields. Consequently, the assessors allowed the stereotyped properties of Tom W’s 
description to command their decision versus incorporating the population statistics for 
each field of study.  Many such studies were performed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974); 
some with stereotyping descriptions, some with no descriptions, and still some with non-
specific descriptions.  The overall response from these studies was that when no 
descriptions were given, prior probabilities were utilized correctly, when descriptions were 
introduced, prior probabilities were ignored.   
 The next bias caused by the representative heuristic is insensitivity to sample size, 
where people assess the likelihood of a sample result by the resemblance of the result to 
the corresponding population parameter.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) perform a study 
where a small hospital and a large hospital each recorded the number of times that the daily 
percentage of boys born reached 60% or greater (versus the norm of 50%).  Students were 
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 then asked which hospital would have recorded more days of 60% male born population or 
if the two hospitals were approximately equal in results. Most assessors believed the two 
hospitals should have been approximately equal because they are representative of the 
general population. These assessments were obviously made without taking into account 
the theory that the smaller hospital would have a greater chance at the 60% because a large 
sample is less likely to stray from the mean (50% male population born).  Lastly, the 
judgment of posterior probabilities, the probability that a sample was chosen from one 
population versus another, has also accounted for such insensitivity.  In this case the 
assessments are dominated by the sample proportion and thus unaffected by the sample 
size.  
 An incorrect interpretation of randomness, where one expects that the condensed 
sequence of events of a random process is representative of the actual process, is another 
bias produced by the representative heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  A good 
example is when people view the sequence H-T-H-H-T-H of a flip of a coin as more likely 
than H-H-H-T-T-T because it appears to be more random, even though both are just as 
likely. This also includes the gambler’s fallacy; when a gambler believes that a black is due 
after a long run of red on the roulette wheel because a black would start to restore the 
equilibrium of the process. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) note that, “deviations are not 
‘corrected’ as a chance process unfolds, they are merely diluted” (p.1125).  
  Insensitivity to predictability occurs when assessors make predictions (e.g., the 
outcome of game or future value of stock) based on descriptions and their favorability 
instead of evidence and the expected accuracy of prediction (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
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 It should be that if no description is available or relevant, predictions should mirror one 
another and furthermore, the higher the predictability, the wider the range of values.  
However, throughout the course of many studies, subjects have shown little regard for the 
considerations of predictability.  
 “The unwarranted confidence which is produced by a good fit between the 
predicted outcome and the input information may be called the illusion of validity” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 p.1126). It will endure even when the assessor is aware of 
his/her own prediction accuracy limiting factors. An example provided by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) states that assessors are more confident in predicting the final grade 
point average of a student with first year grades consisting solely of B’s versus that of a 
student with A’s and C’s because people have greater confidence in predictions based on 
redundancy.  Nevertheless, a prediction based on several inputs is able to achieve higher 
accuracy when independence is prevalent instead of correlation or redundancy.  Thus, even 
though redundancy increases confidence, it decreases accuracy, and the resulting 
judgments are potentially confidently bad.  
 The last bias associated with the representative heuristic is the concept of failure to 
regress.  There is a general phenomenon called regression toward the mean which is the 
notion that for random events, extreme cases will tend to be followed by less extreme cases 
(Clemen & Reilly, 2001). Despite the fact that this notion has been around for more than 
100 years, people generally do not develop accurate intuitions concerning it. People do not 
expect to see it in many situations where it is likely to happen and even when the 
occurrence is recognized, they come up with explanations for it (Tversky & Kahneman, 
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 1974).  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) reference a study concerning a flight training 
instructor in which he praised a student pilot for a smooth landing, whose subsequent 
landing was considerably worse, and criticized a different student pilot for a rough landing, 
whose subsequent landing was considerably better. This led the instructor to conclude that 
verbal praise was detrimental and verbal criticism was beneficial.  The instructor failed to 
recognize that the student pilot who performed badly was probably performing below his 
average level and would likely perform closer to his mean next time around, no matter the 
consequences involved. The same goes for the student pilot who executed a tremendous 
landing; he would probably perform closer to his average (which would be a worse 
landing) for the subsequent flight without regard to consequence or praise. Thus, the 
instructor failed to recognize that the students were regressing to the mean and actually 
overestimated the effect of punishment and underestimated the effect of praise.   
 The availability heuristic is when a probability of an event’s occurrence is assessed 
based on the ease with which we can retrieve similar events from memory (Clemen & 
Reilly, 2001).  It is often easier to recall instances of large classes than those of less 
frequent classes.  External events and influences can have a substantial impact the 
availability of similar incidents.  The biases associated with the availability heuristic are: 
overestimation when events are more easily remembered, underestimation when events are 
harder to recall, effectiveness of a search set bias, imaginability bias, illusory correlation, 
and hindsight bias.  
 A bias is created when the size of class is assessed by the ability to retrieve its 
instances thus; a class with easily retrievable instances will appear more numerous than 
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 that of class whose instances are less retrievable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Familiarity 
is not the only factor for this bias, salience also affects retrievability. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) note this with the idea that seeing a burning house is a greater impact for 
assessment than just reading about a house fire.  Also recent activity is more retrievable 
than earlier activity, therefore the probability judgment concerning automobile accidents 
will rise temporarily when a person witnesses an overturned vehicle.  
 The availability heuristic also provides us with biases due to the effectiveness of a 
search set and different tasks elicit different search sets (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The 
example provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is the supposition that an individual 
samples a random three letter word from the dictionary. The ensuing question is “is it more 
likely that the word starts with r or that r is the third letter?” People judge the word to be 
more likely to begin with r because it is easier to search for words by their first letter 
despite the fact that consonants, such as r, are more frequent in the third position versus the 
first.  
 When a frequency assessment is necessary for a class that is not stored in memory, 
but can be generated by a rule, a bias of imaginability can occur (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Typically for this situation the assessor will think up multiple instances and assess 
the frequency based on the ease of the instance construction. The ease of construction does 
not always reflect the accurate frequency. Imaginability has an important role in the 
probability assessment of real life situations.  The example provided by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) associates the risk involved with an adventurous expedition is evaluated 
by imagining the things that can go wrong and can’t be dealt with. If a whole lot of these 
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 instances can be thought up, the trip can seem overly dangerous even if their actual 
likelihood of occurrence is very small. On the other hand, the risk involved may be 
underestimated if some dangers are not imagined.  
 The illusory correlation bias is a disconnect in the judgment of the frequency of the 
co-occurrence of two events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
presented the draw-a-person test.  It was a situation where subjects were given a diagnosis 
of a mental patient and a portrait drawing made by the patient. The subjects then estimated 
the frequency of a particular diagnosis accompanied by distinguishing facial features on 
the drawing. The subjects overestimated the co-occurrence frequency of natural associates, 
such as peculiar eyes and suspiciousness, because suspiciousness is more readily 
associated with the eyes than any other body part.  When an associative bond is strong 
between two events, they are assumed to occur together frequently.  
 The hindsight bias is when a subject misremembers the degree to which he 
previously forecasted an event’s occurrence, and generally the forecast is remembered to 
be more accurate than it was (Mellers & Locke, 2007). One reason for this bias is that most 
people are better able to recall information that was consistent with the outcome versus 
information that was inconsistent. Mellers and Locke (2007) review a study performed by 
Fischoff and Beyth (1975) involved students that were initially asked to predict what 
would happen in 1972 when Nixon visited China and then later asked to recall their 
probability assessments. Majority of the students recalled themselves being more accurate 
at the two week interval (67%) and most all students recalled better accuracy at the three to 
sixth month interval (84%).  
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 An individual will often assess a probability by selecting an initial anchor point 
(suggested either by formulation of the problem or by result of partial computation) and 
then adjust the anchor based on their knowledge of the specific event (Clemen & Reilly, 
2001). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) term this heuristic anchoring and adjusting. The 
adjustments are usually inadequate since different estimates are obtained because they 
yield to the different starting positions. The anchoring and adjusting heuristic also has 
multiple biases: insufficient adjustment, biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and 
disjunctive events, anchoring in the assessment of subjective probability distributions, 
overconfidence, and even conservatism.  
 The insufficient adjustment bias typifies the anchoring heuristic in general 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring occurs regardless of whether the initial value 
was provided to the subject or they arrived at it from an incomplete computation. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) illustrate this with a study done with high school students were they 
were provided a numerical expression (one ascending (1x2x3x4x5x6x7x8) or one 
descending (8x7x6x5x4x3x2x1)) and only five seconds to estimate the product.  The 
median estimate for the ascending sequence was considerably smaller than the estimate for 
the descending sequence because the first few steps of multiplication for the descending 
sequence was higher than the ascending sequence.  
 Studies of probability judgments suggest that people are inclined to overestimate 
the probabilities of conjunctive events and underestimate the probability of disjunctive 
events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  This is the bias in the evaluation of conjunctive and 
disjunctive events.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) state that planning events prove a 
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 significant bias since they are typically conjunctive because they are comprised of a series 
of events that must occur to accomplish completion.  Even with each event having a high 
likelihood, the probability of success can actually be very small if there are many events to 
consider.  Thus, there is general tendency of unjustifiable optimism due to the 
overestimation of the likelihood of a conjunctive event. Conversely, people tend to 
underestimate the likelihood of failure in complex systems.  
 Another bias of anchoring and adjusting is anchoring in the assessment of 
subjective probability distributions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A probability 
distribution is often constructed by asking the assessor to evaluate specific percentiles then 
producing the distribution curve with the points provided.  Once several different 
distributions are collected, the judge can then be tested for proper calibration. Liberman 
and Tversky (1993) define proper calibration as when a decision maker has his/her 
judgments match the corresponding frequencies. This is different than being resolute; 
when decision maker can discriminate between events that do and do not occur. Over the 
course of many probability elicitations the distributions provided by the experts indicated 
“large and systematic departures from proper calibration” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
This means that the subjects provided overly narrow confidence intervals that suggest their 
certainty does not coincide with their knowledge base of the assessed quantities. The 
elicitation procedure also affects the degree of calibration.  Calibration will be further 
reviewed in chapter 5. 
 The overconfidence bias is associated with the hard easy effect and is created when 
people make the mistake of overestimating their knowledge (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).  
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 Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting (1991) provided the description that the 
overconfidence effect occurs when the confidence judgments are larger than the relative 
frequencies of the correct answers. The hard-easy effect occurs when the degree of 
overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the questions, where the difficulty is 
measure by the percentage of correct answers.  Continuously, confidence in one’s 
immediate and spontaneous knowledge (rather than long term reflection) is largely 
determined by the structure of the task and the structure of a corresponding, known 
environment in a person’s long-term memory. Gigerenzer et al (1991) provide a 
framework, probabilistic mental model, which explains the overconfidence effect and 
predicts the conditions under which the effect appears. This framework is detailed below. 
Brenner, Koehler, and Liberman (1996) note that the selection of difficult questions leads 
to “spurious” overconfidence, conversely the deliberate exclusion of difficult questions is 
likely to produce underconfidence. Through studies and research Brenner et al determine 
that the major (not sole) reason for overconfidence is question difficulty and not how the 
questions are selected (i.e. random vs. nonrandom selection).  Liberman and Tversky 
(1993) distinguish between two types of overconfidence; specific, referring to the 
overestimation of the probability of a specific event, and generic, referring to the 
overestimation of the probability of the event that the subject considers most likely.  
Lastly, Mellers and Locke (2007) correlate overconfidence to the above average effect, 
“closely related is the above average effect when people perceive themselves as being 
better than others on most desirable attributes, including honesty, cooperativeness, etc.” 
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  Keren (1997) suggests the idea that overconfidence and the hard-easy effect may be 
due to regression towards the mean. Keren (1997) notes that even though regression 
towards the mean may induce overconfidence, the concept does not rule out genuine 
overconfidence. Additionally, even unbiased estimates are subject to random error and the 
larger the random error the larger the regression effect. As for genuine overconfidence, 
Keren (1997) reviews a study that he previously performed with bridge players that 
suggests that at least part of the exhibited overconfidence “was genuine and caused by 
cognitive or motivational factors” (p.273).  Some of these factors may include a subject 
who tends to think more in terms of positive reasons and consequently affirmative 
evidence appears larger than disconfirming evidence; that overestimation of our 
intellectual abilities is actually deeply rooted in humans; a social norm that encourages 
overconfidence because knowledge is prized and ignorance is appalling; and/or a self 
motivation mechanism (e.g. a soccer fan believes his favorite team will win even if losing 
at the midpoint of the game).  
 Another bias from the anchoring and adjusting heuristic is the conservatism bias 
suggested by Wallsten and Budescu (1983).  Conservatism is a bias towards the prior 
probabilities when a subject is in a position to revise their posterior probabilities, thus high 
probabilities are underestimated and low values are overestimated. There is confusion 
however, concerning whether this bias is formed from subjects who are accurately 
reporting their misguided opinions or if it is from subjects who are biased in translating 
their accurate judgments to probabilities. In addition, conservatism appears to be situation 
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 dependent and is not necessarily specific to the subject’s behavior (Wallsten & Budescu, 
1983). 
Mellers and Locke (2007) also provided some insight into framing effects and their 
bias towards judgment.  When people consider different choices they often accept and 
utilize the information as it was received leading to systematic differences in preference 
known as framing effects.  Behavioral decision researchers discovered that when the same 
option is offered but with different frames, people will repeatedly reverse their preferences.  
A good example is providing decision makers with a decision concerning an unknown 
Asian disease expected to kill 600 people presented by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). 
The two frames present the same situation differently: the gain frame has a program A in 
which 200 people will be saved and a program B where there is a 1/3 chance that 600 
people will be saved and 2/3 chance that no-one will, and the loss frame has a program A 
in which 400 people will die and a program B where there is a 1/3 that no one will die and 
a 2/3 chance that 600 people will die.  Despite that fact that the situation for each program 
was the same in both frames, the majority of people preferred the gain frame.  Mellers and 
Locke (2007) stated it best with “frames are subtle, yet consequential” (p.9).   
Similar to framing effects is the idea that stimuli contexts, either local or global, 
can alter a response from a subject (Mellers & Locke, 2007).  The explanation of this idea 
is that responses to the same event will differ based on the surrounding stimuli.  The 
example provided by Mellers and Locke is that a ten pound sack of apples will appear light 
in weight after carrying a fifty pound child but will appear heavy in weight after carrying a 
can of soda.  
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  Another noteworthy bias, discussed by Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975), is the 
motivational bias.  A motivational bias is when a subject adjusts an assessment based on 
the perception of a personal reward for various responses. Thus, the subject may be 
influencing the decision in his/her favor by giving a specific set of assessments. The 
motivational bias can show up either consciously, a salesman predicting low sales so that 
his numbers are greater than forecasted, or subconsciously, a doctor who gives a higher 
likelihood of survival because she is hoping that a preferred patient will survive.  Related 
to the motivational bias is the ego bias, suggested by Winkler and Poses (1993), which is 
an illusion of control that can lead to higher assessed probabilities of desired outcomes like 
patient survival. Winkler and Poses (1993) also defined the “hanging crepe” bias, whereby 
a physician may provide a lower probability of survival so as to not raise any hopes and 
furthermore attribute any survival to the skill of the physician.  
  Gigerenzer et al (1991) claim that even though the cognitive bias research supports 
that people naturally make mistakes in reasoning and memory, including overestimating 
their knowledge, that people are in fact decent judges of the reliability of their knowledge 
provided that it is representative of a specific reference class. Basically, the overconfidence 
bias results as a consequence of selection instead of some deficient cognitive heuristic. 
They present a framework that helps to explain a broad range of the experimental findings 
concerning confidence, including inconsistencies. In addition, the theory for which this 
framework is based deals with spontaneous confidence or an immediate reaction instead of 
a product of long reflection.  
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  The framework presented by Gigerenzer et al (1991), exhibited by a flow chart in 
figure 3.1, supports two strategies when presented with a two-alternative confidence task.  
The first is for the subject to attempt to construct a local mental model (local MM) which 
is a solution created by memory and elementary logic.  The second strategy is to create a 
probabilistic mental model (PMM) using probabilistic information from a natural 
environment if the local MM fails. Figure 3.1, provided by Gigerenzer et al (1991, p.508), 
are the cognitive processes in solving a two-alternative general-knowledge task with MM 
representing a mental model and PMM representing a probabilistic mental model.  
 
  
A local MM can be created successfully if the subject can retrieve precise figures 
from memory for both alternatives, retrieve non-overlapping intervals, and have 
elementary logical operations compensate for absent knowledge. The structure is as 
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 follows: first, the task is local, meaning only two alternatives are taken into account and 
there is no generation of a reference class; second, it is direct, meaning no probabilities 
cures are utilized and it only contains the target variable; third, only inferences of 
elementary operations of deductive logic occur; and fourth, upon a successful search the 
confidence in the produced knowledge is evaluated as certain (Gigerenzer et al,1991).  
If a local MM cannot be created by the subject, a PMM is created and solves the 
task with inductive inference by connecting the structure of the task with a corresponding 
probability structure. The PMM differs from the local MM because it contains a reference 
class, it uses a network of variables in addition to the target variable, hence it is neither 
local nor direct, the cognitive process includes probabilistic inference, and uncertainty is 
included in the outcome. The purpose of the reference class is to “determine which cues 
can function as probability cues for the target variable and what their cue validities are,” 
where cue validities are thought of as conditional probabilities (Gigerenzer et al,1991). The 
probability cues are then generated, tested, and when possible, activated with the 
assumption that the order in which cues are generated is based on the hierarchy of cue 
validities. The end of the cue generation and testing cycle for typical general knowledge 
questions comes if there is a time constraint or the number of problems is large and after 
the first cue is found that can be activated if the activation rate of cues is small. The cue 
validity determines the choice of answer and confidence judgment, with choice following 
the rule; choose a if , and the confidence, if a is chosen, that 
a is correct is given by the cue validity;  where a and b are objects that are 
);|();|( RbaCbpRbaCap ii >
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 included in reference class R and Ci is a probability cue for a target variable in R 
(Gigerenzer et al,1991).   
Gigerenzer et al (1991) also argue that the probabilities of single events 
(confidences) and the relative frequencies are not evaluated by the same cognitive 
processes. They state that the general knowledge tasks that are frequency tasks, i.e. involve 
a judgment of the frequency of correct answers, can rarely be answered by creating a local 
MM because the structure of the task contains one sequence of N questions and answers 
with the number of correct answers being the target variable. In addition, the PMM’s of 
frequency tasks and confidence tasks differ because each supports a different reference 
class, the target variables are different, and the PMM of the frequency task will contain 
different cues and cue validities. Overall, the PMM is what connects the task structure with 
a known structure the subject’s environment and confidence and frequency judgments refer 
to different kinds of reference classes (Gigerenzer et al,1991).  
Five predictions are made from Gigerenzer et al (1991) concerning overconfidence 
with relation to the PMM framework provided above. The first prediction is that “typical 
general knowledge tasks elicit both overconfidence and accurate frequency judgments” 
with the term typical referring to a set of questions that is “representative for the reference 
class “sets of general knowledge questions”” (p.10).  This condition is brought forth from 
the notion that “if PMMs for confidence task are well adapted to an environment 
containing a reference class R and the actual set of questions is not representative of R, 
then confidence judgments exhibit overconfidence” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.511).  In 
addition, if correct answer frequency question PMMs are well adapted with respect to a 
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 reference class R’ environment and the 
actual set of questions is representative of 
R’, then frequency judgments are expected 
to be accurate. Combined, the statements 
predict that the same subject will exhibit 
overconfidence in a particular answer and 
accurate estimates of a frequency of c
answers. The two points on the left side of 
figure 3.2, provided by Gigerenzer et al 
(1991, p.511), are representative of this prediction.  
orrect 
The second prediction is that “if the set of general knowledge tasks is randomly 
sampled from a natural environment, where natural environment denotes a knowledge 
domain familiar to the subjects, we expect overconfidence to be zero, but frequency 
judgments to exhibit underestimation” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.512). This condition is 
brought forth from the notion that “if PMMs for confidence tasks are well adapted with 
respect to R and the actual set of questions is representative sample from R, then 
overconfidence is expected to disappear” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.512). In addition, if 
correct answer frequency question PMMs are well adapted with respect to R’, and the 
actual question set is not representative for R’ then frequency judgments are expected to be 
underestimations of true frequency. The others side of figure 3.2 is representative of this 
prediction.  
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 The third prediction is “comparing estimated relative frequencies with true relative 
frequencies of correct answers makes overestimation disappear” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 
p.512). Basically, overestimation or underestimation is expected to be null if the set of 
questions is randomly sampled. Thus, psychologically speaking there is a real distinction 
between confidence and relative frequency wherein subjects do not believe a confidence 
judgment of X% implies a relative frequency of X%.   
Prediction four states, “if two sets, hard and easy, are generated by the same 
sampling process, the hard easy effect is expected to be zero” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 
p.512). If both the hard and easy set deviate equally from representative sampling, points 
will lie on a zero confidence parallel line.  
The fifth and final prediction is “if there are two sets, one is a representative sample 
from a reference class in a natural environment, the other is selected from another 
reference class for being difficult, but the representative set is harder than the selected set; 
then the hard easy is reversed” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.512). 
Gigerenzer et al performed two studies to test the first, second, and third 
predictions.  The results of the studies suggested that the first prediction is viable because 
there were quite accurate frequency judgments that coexisted with overconfidence.  The 
second prediction was deemed viable because in the representative set, overestimation in 
confidence judgments disappeared and zero overconfidence coexisted with frequency 
judgments showing large underestimation. In the second study, overconfidence in single 
answer coexisted with mostly accurate frequency judgments that showed slight 
underestimation.  For the third prediction, the subjects of the first study distinguished 
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 between confidence in single answers and relative frequency of correct answers which was 
implied by the PMM theory where different reference classes are cued by confidence and 
frequency tasks. The only finding that didn’t conform to prediction three was that the 
magnitude of underestimation was not as pronounced as expected.  The second study 
resulted in the subject’s average estimated percentage correct was different from 
confidence and similar to the actual percent correct.   
Gigerenzer et al (1991) summarize that overconfidence results from one of two 
causes or both jointly; “a PMM for a task is not properly adapted to a corresponding 
environment, or the set of objects used is not a representative sample from the 
corresponding reference class in the environment but is selected for difficulty” (p.25). 
Therefore confidence should not be eliminated if the first cause is true and should be 
eliminated if the second is true.  
Brenner, Koehler, and Liberman (1996) disagree with the final results of 
Gigerenzer et al (1991) because of new studies in the recent past.  Brenner et al (1996) 
state that the predictions of the PMM, that a random sampling of questions from a natural 
domain will eliminate confidence and random sampling will eliminate the hard easy effect, 
were both wrong. This is due to recent studies that show for questions of relatively high 
difficulty, overconfidence is prevalent with random sampling of the questions from a 
natural domain of knowledge. Brenner et al review a study done by Griffin and Tversky 
(1992) whereby random pairs of states were selected (e.g. Virginia, Iowa) and subjects 
were asked which state had a higher value for some attribute (e.g. population) with an 
assessment of their confidence in each answer. The results showed significant 
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 overconfidence for all attributes (contrary to first prediction) and also overconfidence for 
the more difficult attributes (contrary to the second prediction).  
The majority of biases that can be brought forth by the use of uncertainty in 
decision making were presented in this chapter. The subsequent chapters will review some 
proper methods for eliciting unbiased probabilities and other methods for improving the 
assessments provided.   
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CHAPTER 4 How To Elicit Probabilities Properly 
 
 Even though people can be irrational when left to their own devices, they are not 
typically irrational in all situations, therefore an analyst should aim to structure a situation 
where biases are minimized and the assessments determined actually symbolize the 
subject’s opinions (Wallsten & Budescu, 1983).  This chapter is aimed at providing the 
methods to accomplish such a task.  The methods presented by Spetzler and Von Holstein 
(1975) and Keeney and Von Winterfeldt (1991) are aimed at eliciting accurate probabilities 
while minimizing the effects of the biases presented in the previous chapter.  
 Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) start with a set of five principles to use as a 
guideline for encoding uncertain quantities, and violating any one of these principles can 
lead to problems in the encoding process. The first principle is to choose only those 
uncertainties that are important to the decision itself. Principle two is to define the quantity 
as an unambiguous state variable; a state variable being one that has values beyond the 
control of the decision maker.  The third principle states that the quantity should be 
structured carefully with thoughtful consideration to conditionalities. Principle four is to 
define the quantity precisely by performing the clairvoyance test. The fifth and final 
principle is to describe the quantity using an appropriate scale that the subject finds 
meaningful, so that the subject doesn’t spend time trying to fit his/her answers to the scale 
versus evaluating the uncertainty.  
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  When it comes to encoding methods, Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) review the 
P (probabilities) and V (values) methods for answers that can be represented as points on a 
cumulative distribution function. There are three basic types of these methods: the P-
method requires the subject to specify probability points with fixed values, the V-method 
requires the subject to specify value points with fixed probabilities, and the PV-method 
requires the subject to answer questions based on both scales simultaneously. These 
methods are explained in more detail later by Clemen and Reilly (2001).  
The above mentioned questions can either be answered directly, by providing 
numbers, or indirectly, by choosing between alternatives until an indifference point is 
determined. Direct assessment, or structured questioning, supports data generation with 
questioning schemes that are designed to trigger elements in the subject’s associate 
memory (Benson et al, 1995).  There are multiple indirect response techniques to choose 
from. One option is the probability wheel which is a disk with two adjustable sections and 
a fixed pointer in which the subject determines which event is more likely until equality is 
reached. Another option is to use fixed probability events whereby the subject is asked to 
judge values that correspond to fixed probabilities. One can use the interval technique 
whereby an interval is split and the subject is asked which bet is preferred then subintervals 
are introduced until quartiles are determined. An additional option is the use of relative 
likelihoods, which is when the subject is requested to assign odds to two well defined 
events. There are also multiple direct response techniques to choose from. One option 
involves cumulative probability and fractiles, whereby the subject is asked to assign the 
cumulative probability at a given value or vise versa. A visual option involves the use of 
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 graphs in which the subject either draws or must choose one graph, out of several 
provided, with a density function. Another option uses verbal encoding whereby verbal 
descriptions are used to characterize events and then quantitative interpretations are added. 
Benson, Curley, and Smith (1995) suggest that graphic representation is one of the most 
used and best developed aids for assessment, with decision trees being the dominant form 
of problem representation.  However, graphic methods have a limitation in being a weak 
account of relevance because they construe relevance as probabilistic dependence. Thus, 
graphic representation, like other existing aids, has a limiting account of relevance and 
therefore has a tendency to constrain rather than exploit the variety of reasoning strategies 
that humans are capable of (Benson et al, 1995). The indirect response mode is generally 
the better way to begin encoding because subjects tend to experience difficulty in giving 
direct numerical probability (Spetzler & Von Holstein, 1975).  Additionally, indirect 
assessment avoids the availability heuristic because subjects will not be assessing 
probabilities directly based on memory.  
 Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) provide an interview process procedure that is 
divided into five phases: motivating, structuring, conditioning, encoding, and verifying.  
The purpose of the motivating phase is twofold; introduce the subject to the encoding task 
at hand and explore the possibility of any motivational biases. The structuring phase is 
designed to define the uncertain quantity to be assessed. Wallsten and Budescu (1983) 
suggest that when encoding an expert’s (or non-expert) opinion, it is imperative that the 
analyst carefully specifies the class of events in question, the sources of information to be 
considered, and the potential causes of unreliability in the information (e.g. sampling 
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 error).  The anchoring and adjusting heuristic can play a key role when/if the analyst 
accidentally gives undue weight to the earliest information considered. The third phase, 
conditioning, is meant to review how the subject assesses probabilities so that any potential 
biases can be avoided.  The analyst should review the heuristics with the subject so as to 
introduce them to how the majority of people process uncertainty and thus attempt to 
eliminate the majority of the biases associated with the heuristics.  The encoding phase is 
exactly that, encoding the uncertain quantity.  The suggested route to take is to begin by 
asking for the extreme values, use the probability wheel with a new set of values to encode 
the corresponding probability levels, plot each response provided on a cumulative 
distribution, and use the interval technique to generate the median and quartiles.  This 
route is suggested to ensure that the biases associated with anchoring and adjusting are 
eliminated. 
In the final verifying phase the assessment is reviewed and tested for subject 
approval.  If the subject is not comfortable with the assignments he has provided, the 
process may need to be repeated as many times necessary until the subject is confident 
with his judgments.  A typical interview should last thirty to ninety minutes depending on 
the complexity of the situation.  Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) make a final note that 
the pre-encoding steps generally take longer than the encoding steps but are the most 
essential to good probability assignments.  In addition, interactive techniques have proven 
to facilitate judgment by minimizing randomness and eliminate unwanted inconsistencies 
(Wallsten & Budescu, 1983). 
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  Keeney and Von Winterfeldt (1991) provided some lessons learned from the 
NUREG 1150 study (a study performed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
estimate the uncertainties of accidents in nuclear power plants) and also a recommended 
process for eliciting probabilities from experts.  The recommended process for eliciting 
probabilities from experts consists of seven components: identification and selection of the 
issues; identification and selection of the experts; discussion and refinement of the issues; 
training for elicitation; elicitation; analysis, aggregation, and resolution of disagreements; 
and documentation and communication.  
 The identification and selection of issues component emphasizes that even before 
the study begins, it is important to recognize all uncertainties that need expert probability 
elicitation and select the ones that need to go through a formal elicitation procedure. The 
second component, identification and selection of experts, is crucial and should involve 
both specialists and analysts. Specialists should be the most knowledgeable in their field of 
study and the analysts who perform the elicitation should have expertise in probability 
theory, statistics and decision analysis.  The third component, the discussion and 
refinement of the issues, should be conducted in a meeting of the specialists and analysts.  
The intent of this first meeting is to ensure that the specialists understand the project and 
what is expected of them and to arrive at unambiguous definitions of the events and the 
uncertainties that will be elicited. The in depth definition discussion amongst experts 
should help to eliminate biases associated with the representative heuristic with the 
elimination of any ambiguity.   
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  After the first meeting is completed, the issues are clarified, and the specialists are 
given some time to think about the issues at hand, the training for elicitation should be 
conducted.  It is suggested that the training be performed by an analyst with intent to 
familiarize the specialist with the techniques used in elicitation, provide them with an 
assessment practice session, inform them of the potential biases that can occur, and 
motivate them on their judging task at hand.  Wallsten and Budescu (1983) determined that 
the accuracy of the assessments determined by either direct or indirect methods can be 
increased with just simple and short training procedures.  
 Keeney and Von Winterfeldt (1991) proclaim that the elicitation process, the fourth 
component, is an interview between the specialist and analyst with a possible generalist 
assistant who provides project inputs and recording services. The interview should start 
with an informal discussion of the specialist’s approach to the issue and review of the 
event definitions in order to map out the decomposition to identify the necessary 
judgments. Next, a series of easy questions should be asked to determine the probabilities 
or probability distributions of the decomposition, followed by harder questions. 
Consistency checks should be administered once the judged probabilities are obtained. The 
endpoints or boundaries are next defined, followed by the fractiles with assessing the 
median judgment first. The determination of endpoints first helps to eliminate any 
anchoring that might occur on behalf of the specialist. A graphical depiction should be 
maintained throughout the entire process with continuous consistency checks. 
 The next step in Keeney and Von Winterfeldt’s overall process is the analysis, 
aggregation, and resolution of disagreements component. It is not always feasible to 
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 combine the specialist’s judgments during the elicitation process, thus the analyses should 
be provided to the specialist as soon as possible after the interview so that any necessary 
changes can be made while the interview is still fresh in mind. Aggregation across the 
experts is then performed by an averaging process with the addition of a sensitivity 
analysis. A final group meeting can be held for all specialists and analysts involved to 
establish any agreements or disagreements on the probabilities elicited or events in 
question.  
 The final component, documentation and communication, is actually performed 
throughout the entire elicitation procedure. At the very minimum, documentation of 
elicitation results and reasoning, event definitions, expert identification and selection, the 
training session, the actual elicitation session, and the aggregation and analysis should be 
maintained.   
 Mellers and Locke (2007) have additional suggestions for the elicitation procedures 
to eliminate biases. The first concerns disclosure, which is a common procedure for 
constraining self interest and is based on the assumption that when a subject reveals of a 
conflict of interest he will provide a less biased assessment or the analyst will discount the 
assessment and thus result in an unbiased decision. A study performed by Cain et al 
(2005), however suggested that disclosure actually increased the subject’s bias but also 
increased the analyst’s discount, but not enough to correct the initial increase in bias. 
Mellers and Locke (2007) believe the reasoning behind this to be that subjects may feel 
that if their self interests are disclosed they are less liable to recipients and decision makers 
should rely more heavily on their own information without knowing how much the conflict 
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 of interest has affected the provided assessment. In real life, if the decision maker trusts the 
subject providing the assessment and the decision maker is unsure of his own information, 
having a provided disclosure may allow the interpretation that the subject’s information is 
more credible.  
 Another suggestion from Mellers and Locke (2007) for the elimination of biases 
during the elicitation procedure is to apply accountability to the situation, because pre-
decision accountability to an unknown audience can reduce cognitive biases especially 
those biases resulting from lack of effort of understating one’s own judgmental processes. 
This suggestion can however have a null or detrimental effect if the decision maker hedges 
his choice by sticking with the status quo. For the last suggestion, Mellers and Locke 
(2007) state that some tasks, such as recall of items and the effects of anchoring and 
adjusting, showed improved performance with the use of incentives. Incentives can 
however be harmful if the task is too complicated and most studies actually showed little 
effect on performance with the use of incentives.  
 Clemen and Reilly (2001) identify three basic methods for assessing discrete 
probabilities. The first method is to simply ask the decision maker what the probability of 
the event’s occurrence is.  The problem with this method is the lack of confidence that the 
assessor will undoubtedly have in their answer.  The second method is to question the 
decision maker about any bets they would be willing to place on the event’s occurrence.  
The notion behind this method is to find a specific value to win or lose such that the 
decision maker is indifferent about which bet to take.  The example provided for this 
method is centered on an NBA championship game between the Lakers and Pistons. The 
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 value of interest is the decision maker’s probability that the Lakers will win the game. The 
decision maker is willing to take either of the following two bets: Bet 1, Win $X if the 
Lakers win or Lose $Y if the Lakers lose; and Bet 2, Lose $X if the Lakers win or Win $Y 
if the Lakers lose. Figure 4.1, provided 
by Clemen and Reilly (2001, p.300), is 
the decision tree that represents what the 
decision maker faces. As you can see by 
the decision tree this is a V-method 
because the value is being modified until 
an indifference point between the bets is determined. With some simple reductions, the 
subjective probability for the decision maker that the Lakers will win can be represented by 
the equation: 
YX
YsWinLaP +=)ker( .  Thus, if a friend was willing to take either side of 
the bet: Win $2.50 if the Lakers win or Lose $3.80 if the Lakers lose, his subjective 
probability would be 3.80/(2.50+3.80) = 0.063 (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).  
 Clemen and Reilly (2001) explain that the method to finding a bet that a decision 
maker is willing to take either side of is fairly basic. The first step is to offer a bet that is 
highly favorable to one side or another and make note of which side the decision maker 
chooses. Next, offer a bet that heavily favors the other side and ask which side is now 
preferable. Continue this process of offering bets back and forth that favor each side and 
adjust the payoffs gradually as you persist. By adjusting the bet to be either more or less 
attractive based on the previous bet each time, the indifference point can be reached. This 
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 method of starting with extremes and working inward avoids anchoring, assuming that the 
starting points are extreme enough to bound the possible values. This process nonetheless 
may not avoid the framing bias because the prizes are variable and one frame could look 
better than the other even though they are the same situation based on the same outcome. 
The betting approach also has related problems; most people are risk averse and don’t like 
the idea of betting and this approach presumes that the individual cannot protect himself 
from losses by “hedging” one bet with another. Yet, because this approach does not permit 
protection by “hedging” the conservatism bias should be avoided.  
 The third method for assessing discrete probabilities is to have the decision maker 
compare two lotterylike games, either of which can result in a Prize (A or B) (Clemen & 
Reilly, 2001).  This method is easiest if the prize structure is set up so that the decision 
maker prefers Prize A (e.g. a free vacation in Hawaii) to Prize B (e.g. a free beer). This 
method is representative of the P-method because the values (prizes) are fixed and the 
point is to obtain the associated probabilities. Clemen and Reilly continue their prior 
example concerning the NBA c
this method. For this method, the 
analyst would ask the decision m
to compare the lottery, Win Prize A if
the Lakers win or Win Prize B if 
Lakers lose, with the second 
‘reference lottery’, Win Prize A with 
known probability p or Win Prize B with probability 1-p. Figure 4.2, provided by Clemen 
hampionship game between the Lakers and the Pistons with 
aker 
 
the 
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 and Reilly (2001, p.302), is the decision tree representation for this decision.  The 
probability mechanism must be well specified for the reference lottery and can be as 
simple as drawing a colored ball from an urn with proportion p of colored balls or using a 
“wheel of fortune,” with a win section and a pointer that provides the decision maker wit
Prize A when it lands in the win section. Once an understood mechanism is in place, the 
analyst adjusts the probability of winning in the reference lottery until the decision m
reaches indifference between the two lotteries. The subjective probability that the Lakers 
win must be the p that makes the decision maker indifferent, meaning that the decision 
maker has no preference between the two lotteries and slightly changing the probability p 
makes one or the other clearly preferable.  
 Clemen and 
h 
aker 
Reilly define a method for obtaining the p that makes the decision 
aker  
o 
 
 
nd 
providing realistic assessments.  
m indifferent between the two lotteries. Start with some probability p1 and question
which lottery is preferred. If the reference lottery is preferred, then p1 must be too high, s
choose a p2 less than p1 and ask for the preference again. Continue this process of adjusting
the probability in the reference lottery and questioning preferences until the indifference 
point is found. An analyst should start with exceptionally wide brackets and converge on 
the indifference point slowly, allowing time for the decision maker to deliberate about the
assessment and thus avoiding anchoring. Additionally, because the prizes are fixed in this 
method, framing effects can also be avoided. There are still problems even with this 
approach to probability assessment. Some people don’t like the idea of lottery game a
others have difficulty understanding a hypothetical game and thus have problems 
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  The last step in the discrete probability assessing process for all three meth
check for consistency. It is impor
ods is to 
tant that the probabilities be consistent amongst 
emse
bilities is 
ations 
lity. The first strategy is to assess the probability for a few values, plot 
em, a lues 
 
t 
(2001, p.304), is the decision tree re
th lves and the assessed probabilities should also obey all probability laws; 
probabilities must lie between zero and one, probabilities must add up, and total 
probability must equal one (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).  If the set of assessed proba
found to be inconsistent, the decision maker should reconsider and make modific
where necessary.  
 Clemen and Reilly (2001) also discuss two methods for assessing a subjective 
continuous probabi
th nd then draw a smooth curve through the points. Thus, one must select a few va
from the horizontal axis and then assess the corresponding cumulative probabilities.  The 
example provided for consideration is deriving a probability distribution to represent the 
uncertainty of a movie star’s age. A typical cumulative assessment would be represented 
by P(Age ≤ a), where a is the particular value. So if the subject were to consider P(Age ≤ 
46), the decision maker could use 
any of the three methods previously 
provided for assessing discrete 
probabilities to find the probability p
that would make them indifferen
between the lotteries. Figure 4.3, 
provided by Clemen and Reilly 
presentation of this problem. 
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 The second strategy for assessing the cumulative distribution function is to reve
the method and pick a few cumulative probab
rse 
ilities from the vertical axis and assess the 
corresp
 it 
 
ds such as most likely, fairly, least likely, etc.) versus numerical and the 
notion ns 
 
 
e 
onding ages. An example for this method is the supposition that the decision maker 
wants to assess a corresponding value for the probability 0.35.  Consequently, a0.35 is 
called the 0.35 distribution fractile. By using what was assessed; P(Age ≤ 29) = 0.00, 
P(Age ≤ 40) = 0.05, P(Age ≤ 44) = 0.50, P(Age ≤ 50) = 0.85, and P(Age ≤ 65) = 1.00,
can determined that the 0.35 fractile of the distribution is approximately 42 years. The 
general term fractile includes the median (the 0.50 fractile), quartiles (the 0.25 and 0.75 
fractiles), and even the percentiles (the 0.10 fractile is the 10th percentile) of the 
distribution. After eliciting the values for each of these fractiles, the points should be 
plotted on a graph and a smooth line should be drawn through the points (Clemen & 
Reilly, 2001).  
A situation of discontent is the argument of using verbal assessment (i.e. using
descriptive wor
that most people would prefer verbal estimates because they convey their opinio
more accurately.  Wallsten, Budescu, and Zwick (1993) remind us that people, generally
speaking when making a decision, prefer to communicate verbally and receive information
numerically.  In addition, Wallsten et al determined that the overall quality of decisions 
made from verbal probability assessment was not different than those made with numerical 
probability assessment aside from differences in their patterns. Wallsten et al (1993) 
propose that if a verbal probability elicitation is to be performed, the analyst should 
provide a fixed list of approximately eleven to fifteen words and those words should b
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 assigned numerical values by the subject. A main difference between the two method
(verbal vs. numerical), as determined by Wallsten et al (1993) in their experiment, is tha
while overconfidence was prevalent in both models, the magnitude was greater in the 
verbal response method. They recognize that the honesty encouraged by the verbal method
allows the analyst to see that overconfidence is even greater than was apparent when u
the numerical method.  The main advantage of verbal encoding is that the forecaster is 
more comfortable with their assessments, however numerical encoding provides a higher 
level of resolution, thus the trade-off is that the 50% category is more widely used in the
numerical method and overconfidence is greater with the verbal method. Wallsten et al 
(1993) suggest that the reasoning behind using the 50% category in the numerical method
is because it is equally defensible regardless of the final outcome and furthermore, the 
verbal method, because it allows vagueness, relieves the stress of assessment defense.   
The basic steps of proper probability elicitation from an expert – explaining the 
problem in depth, training the subject on the cognitive heuristics and their associated 
s 
t 
 
sing 
 
 
biases, 
r 
d 
eliciting the probability through an in depth interview process, and verifying the 
assessments – will eliminate most biases presented in chapter three.  There are howeve
further steps that can be taken to improve the probabilities because of overconfidence an
other biases that slipped through the cracks during the elicitation process. These 
improvement methods are presented in chapter five.  
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 CHAPTER 5 Improvement of Assessments 
 
 This chapter brings to the forefront ways to improve the probabilities elicited, 
eliminate some of the biases defined in chapter three that weren’t eliminated by the 
elicitation procedures defined in chapter four, and in addition, some potential assessment 
practices to avoid them from the very start.  This chapter will review the concept of 
calibration and its role in the process of probability elicitation. Concerning calibration and 
refinement, Wallsten and Budescu (1983) and Liberman and Tversky (1993) provide some 
general thoughts on the subject, Harrison (1977) discusses issues with independence and 
calibration, Degroot and Fienberg (1983) provide calibration and refinement methods for 
evaluating and comparing forecasters, and Keren (1997) reviews some of the problems 
associated with calibration.  The issue of coherence is discussed by Lindley, Tversky, and 
Brown (1979) who tackle the problem on incoherence with two reconciliation approaches 
and Lindley (1982) who evaluates whether assessment can be improved by having a better 
understanding of the assessment mechanism. Finally, the concept of decomposition is 
reviewed by Ravinder, Kleinmuntz, and Dyer (1988) who suggest the decomposition 
method for obtaining more reliable subjective probabilities, Howard (1989) who shows us 
how knowledge maps that represent decomposition are a convenient process for 
representing knowledge and the involved uncertainty, and finally, Moskowitz and Sarin 
(1983) who test whether using a judgmental aid will reduce in the number of inconsistent 
probability assessments. 
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 5.1. Calibration and Refinement 
A method for attempting to establish the validity of a probability elicitation method or of a 
y 
t 
n 
 that 
he other 
r 
mpute the calibration curve which plots assessed probability 
gainst observed frequency.  The calibration curve should mirror a 45 degree line and if it 
subject is deemed calibration (Wallsten & Budescu, 1983). Calibration is determined b
whether for all events assigned probability p, the proportion that occurs is actually p and it 
is therefore an indirect measure of validity. Wallsten and Budescu (1983) also note that 
there are training methods that can improve calibration and one method in particular 
suggested by Koriat et al. is to have the subjects list reasoning for and against their 
assessments which yields improvement because subjects generally fail to consider the 
counter-indicants for their decisions. Lastly, Wallsten and Budescu (1983) determined tha
experts are generally well calibrated when making assessments in their field of expertise 
while non-experts are limited but do show great improvement with training.  
Harrison (1977) provides a discussion on the operational issue brought forth by 
calibration error and he argues that, “the existence of calibration error does not affect the 
theoretical justifications for the subjective view of probability, but does severely restrict 
what we can do with subjective assessments” (p.320). Thus, the issue is whether we ca
justify independence assumptions with subjectively assessed probabilities. This means
if a subject learns about the occurrence of an event it will potentially inform him of his 
own assessing characteristics and thus might affect the assessment he makes for t
event.  Harrison uses the calibration exercise, which is to select random variables of 
unknown quantities, assess the subjective distribution for each, observe the actual value fo
each variable, and then co
a
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 doesn’t, the subject is deemed miscalibrated as an assessor for that particular group of 
se to 
 
Liberman and Tversky (1993) designate two forms of calibration plots, the 
designated form, where a target event is pre-selected for each problem and the data are 
displayed based on the assigned probabilities to the events with disregard to their 
complements, and the inclusive form, where the probabilities assigned to the two 
complementary events are incorporated for each problem. The usage for each form differs 
in the designated form is generally used when all judgments refer to a common hypothesis 
distributions.  Figure 5.1 shows three separate calibration curves: a well calibrated 
forecaster, an overconfident forecaster, and an underconfident forecaster.  Note the 
overconfident forecaster’s curve is representative of his tendency to use values close to the 
boundaries instead of values approximate to the median range.  The underconfident 
forecaster exhibits the exact opposite trend with over-usage of the range of values clo
0.5 and under-usage the extreme values.  
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 (e.g. rain vs. no rain, etc.) and the inclusive form is generally used with general knowle
problems that have no common hypothesis, although the form is not dictated by the
hypotheses under consideration. Liberman and Tversky (1993) note that both the 
designated and the inclusive indices can be useful for describing and evaluating probability 
assessments but the inclusive analysis is deemed appropriate when there is interest in
subject’s use of the probability scale, not necessarily the specific outcome, and the 
designated analysis is more relevant when
dge 
 
 the 
 there is interest in the specific outcome 
prediction.  
Harrison (1977) provides an example where a subject is asked for the subjective 
probability distributions (Fk) for a series of 1000 numerical almanac quantities (Xk). The 
analyst uses the probability wheel elicitation procedure to aid in the probability 
assessments by determining the setting of the wheel that makes the subject indifferent 
between the lottery L, where a payoff depends on the percentage of the random variables 
that actually have values less than or equal to the 30th percentile of the assessed 
distribution, and the reference lottery.  The analyst then looks up the actual numerical 
values for each of the quantities and plots the calibration curve. Now the subject has an 
opportunity to view how calibrated he is and determine if it’s a consequence to how 
reasonable his axioms are.  Harrison notes that the current literature suggests that people 
are generally quite badly miscalibrated as probability assessors and the risk of being 
miscalibrated averts the subject from treating events as independent. Miscalibration can 
occur when a subject anchors to probabilities that are too high or too low, thus the 
anchoring and adjusting heuristic is in effect.  
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  Harrison then provides a statement (*) that the subject might subscribe to 
concerning the nature of the perceived dependence among events that would enable s
concrete calculations, since the dependence issue makes computation nearly impo
Statement (*) declares that there exists a random variable α, such that E
ome 
ssible. 
ndence 
he 
r distribution for α. Thus it follows that mean of the distribution is E(α) = 
P(Ek) =  
r 
 
larger 
t 
y 
d if 
(α8) = 
termined to be unattractive because the 
1,…, E1000 (where 
events Ek = {Xk ≤ xk}) are conditionally independent given α, with P(Ek| α) = α for all k. 
Statement (*) might aid in providing a reasonable approximation to the type of depe
that the subject feels is in existence, and the degree of dependence is expressed by t
subject’s prio
 0.30. Using this statement, Harrison reviews three problems and in each case P(·)
denotes a probability computed from Statement (*) and the indicated prior distribution fo
α, while Q(·) denotes a probability based on the assumption that E1,…, E1000 are 
independent.  
 Harrison’s problem 1 considers a lottery where P gives a wider spread distribution
for K than does Q, and the effect is more pronounced when the outcomes from a 
number of trials are considered. The problem also provides the option of buying perfec
information as to the value of α before deciding whether or not to play. The option to pa
for information shows whether the subject views himself as miscalibrated, and thus 
validates the suggestion that when a subject worries over his potential miscalibration his 
assessments are modified.  Problem 2 considers a lottery where a severe loss is suffere
E1,…, E8 all occur and a moderate gain is enjoyed otherwise. The probabilities are 
calculated (Q(E1 and … and E8) = (0.30)8 = 6.56×10-5 and P(E1 and … and E8) = E
29!16!/8!371 = 3.33×10-4) and the lottery is de
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 negative outcome probability is larger by a factor of about five.  Harrison notes th
percentage error caused by an assumption of independence grows rapidly when one 
increases the number of events being intersected. This is a situation however, where the 
assessor’s uncertainty about his calibration must be accounted for. The third problem lets 
K = θ
at the 
d 
ould be 
hat the sequence of events E1, E2,… could be viewed as exchangeable. The 
at 
e 
 given 
 of 
s.  
1 + … + θ10 (where θk is an indicator variable that equals 1 if Ek occurs and 0 
otherwise) and a lottery L that pays an attractive prize if K = 2, 3, or 4, which are the three 
most likely single values for K, but pays nothing otherwise. The probabilities P(win) an
Q(win) are computed to be 0.63 and 0.70 respectively suggesting that once again the 
assumption of independence introduces significant error.  
 Harrison presents De Finetti’s theorem on how a subject must subscribe to 
Statement (*) if they believe that the original collection of random variables Xk c
augmented so t
theorem consists of two statements and the first is that there exists a random variable α 
such that P{αn → α as n → ∞} = 1, where αn denotes the fraction of the first n events th
occur. Therefore, even though the subject may not actually know the exact value, they ar
positive (probability of one) that a limiting frequency will be achieved. The second 
statement of De Finettis’ theorem is that the events Ek are conditionally independent
α, with P(Ek | α) = α. Thus, α is defined as a limiting calibration factor. De Finetti’s 
theorem shows that a subject can account for his uncertainty about his calibration through 
simple calculations. Overall, Harrison believes that the current professional practice
probability elicitation using the lottery procedure to reduce a sensitive outcome is what 
opens up the possibility of serious error through unwarranted independence assumption
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 In addition, the analyst should have some trepidation about the potential effect of a 
subject’s uncertainty of his own calibration.   
 DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) present an article that provides methods for 
evaluating and comparing forecasters.  They make sure to first differentiate between 
calibration and refinement, as these two concepts are used for comparing forecaster
define calibration as the “agreement between a forecaster’s predictions and the actual 
observed relative frequency of rain” and refinement is specified as “how spread out or how
sharp a forecaster’s predictions are” (DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.13). Thus a forecas
well calibrated if ρ(x) = x, where ρ(x) denotes the relative f
s. They 
 
ter is 
requency of rain on all the days 
v(x) is 
a 
 no 
 
ctive 
y 
that the forecaster’s prediction was x, for every value of x such that v(x) > 0, where 
the frequency function of the forecaster’s predictions over the days.  There are, however, 
few reasons why a forecaster may not be as well calibrated as he would prefer. A 
forecaster’s predictions are only observed for a finite number of days and there really is
reason why his predictions should realistically coincide with the actual occurrence of rain. 
Because being well calibrated is a desirable characteristic of forecasting, a forecaster could
be tempted to actually lie and specify predictions that do not represent his true subje
probabilities in order to attain certain values, thus introducing a motivational bias. Even so, 
a forecaster can be well calibrated with his own predictions in the long run, but if the
aren’t accurate on a specific day, they are of no use. While calibration is a desired 
characteristic of forecasters, it does not ensure informativeness (Liberman & Tversky, 
1993).   
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 DeGroot and Fienberg’s concept of refinement is used to compare the well 
calibrated forecasters. The logical concept for two forecasters who are well calibrated is as 
llows d 
tions 
s at 
 
s two 
fo : “A is at least as refined as B if we can artificially generate a well-calibrate
forecaster with the same probability function vB(x) as B simply by passing A’s predic
through a noisy channel” (DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.14). A forecaster who makes the 
same prediction each day is least-refined because any other well calibrated forecaster i
least as refined as he is.  And on the other end, the forecaster whose predictions are binary 
and always correct is most-refined because he is at least as refined as any other well 
calibrated forecaster. It is possible that a comparison exists and it can be possible that two 
forecasters are just not comparable in terms of refinement. If this be the case, DeGroot and
Fienberg present a theorem, supplied from their previous work (1982), which eliminates 
the need to construct an appropriate stochastic transformation. Theorem 1 consider
well-calibrated forecasters A and B and states that forecaster A is at least as refined as B if 
and only the following inequalities are satisfied: 0)}()(){(
1
0
≥−−∑−
=
Aij iBi
j
i
xvxvxx  for j=1, 
…, k-1.  An example provided by DeGroot and Fienberg (1982) is, if A and B are well-
calibrated with the probability functions; vA(x) = {0.1 for x=0, 0.8 for x=0.5, 0.1 for x=1 
and vB(x) = {0.5 for x=0.1 and 0.5 for x=0.9, then neither A nor B is at least as refined a
the other. The condition provides the reasoning that if “one well calibrated forecast
at least as refined as another well-calibrated forecaster B, and if we must choose betwee
learning 
B s 
er A is 
n 
the prediction of A or learning the prediction of B, then we should choose to learn 
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 the pre  
d 
e in 
at 
choose to learn the prediction of one forecaster versus another. Thus, even if A is sufficient 
subjective yet they are evaluated by frequentistic criterion which provides controversy on 
diction of A regardless of the purposes for which we will use the prediction”
(DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.15).  
It is also possible to compare forecasters who are not necessarily well calibrate
with the concept of sufficiency provided by DeGroot and Fienberg (1983). They define 
sufficiency as, “A is sufficient for B if we can artificially generate a forecaster with the 
same functions vB(x) and ρB(x) as B simply by passing A’s predictions through a noisy 
channel” (DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.16). However, when the forecasters are well 
calibrated, the sufficiency relationship reduces to the refinement relationship. Just lik
refinement, all forecasters might not be comparable in terms of sufficiency and even if 
sufficiency exists it does not automatically assume that one forecaster is as good as the 
other.  A good example provided is if forecaster A only makes binary predictions and is 
always wrong, then he is sufficient for every other forecaster even though he is the worst 
forecasting. However, because he is always wrong, his predictions are just as useful as a 
forecaster who is always right. The concept of sufficiency is based on whether we should 
for B (i.e. we should learn A’s predictions), more information might be obtained if we 
were to learn both sets of predictions instead of just A’s.  DeGroot and Fienbert (1983) 
continue their analysis by using scoring rules to evaluate forecasters with relation to 
calibration and refinement.  The topic of scoring rules will be covered in chapter 6.   
Keren (1997) presents some of the problems associated with the research on 
calibration. His first problem is that studies in calibration assume that probabilities are 
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 the validity of this procedure. The second problem he brings forth concerns the trade
between calibration and resolution, a
-off 
s calibration and resolution are not completely 
indepen or 
 
cond 
ll 
 
hat 
 
showed
ot 
 
dent of one another and there may be incompatibility between the requirements f
maximizing calibration and achieving high resolution.  
Keren (1997) reviews the framework provided by Juslin et al that states there are
three necessary requirements for being well calibrated: first is cognitive adjustment, 
requiring internal probabilities to equal the corresponding ecological probabilities; se
is error free translation, assuming that translation from internal uncertainty to a response 
should be free from error; and third is representative design, requiring the “selection of 
tasks such that the probabilities of the events in the task sample should coincide with 
ecological probabilities” (p.270). Should these assumptions be violated, random error wi
be affected and thus reduce the calibration quality.  Keren notes that this approach does 
adopt a frequentistic interpretation, which in turn makes confidence or probability 
assessments of unique events meaningless, thus limiting the scope of studying how people
deal with uncertainty and also overlooking the fact that judgment of uncertainty in 
everyday life cannot be justified on frequentistic grounds. Furthermore, Juslin et al 
clarifies that the hard-easy effect is inconsistent with the conjunction of the three 
assumptions and in continuation, the third assumption is doubted because of studies t
were performed that made an attempt to employ a representative design, subsequently
 clear overconfidence. Additionally, Keren (1997) provides the error source 
applicable to assumption two; internal probabilities are unobservable and therefore cann
be directly matched to external responses but insight can be obtained from the examination
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 of different response scales (e.g. whether the probability scale is half or full range, a choic
or no choice situation, and/or discrete or continuous).  Additional research to determ
clearer notion of the relevant factors is needed. Overall, Keren (1997) suggests that random 
error can be affected by more than one factor and “the m
e 
ine a 
agnitude of the random error 
affects  
). 
e 
is due 
e they 
nd 
e laws 
 
at 
ped 
the degree of goodness of calibration indirectly by determining the extent to which
regression toward the mean will be present” (p.272).  
 
5.2. Coherence 
The concept of coherence, when an individual’s assessments obey the probability 
postulates, is a necessity for assessed subjective probabilities (Clemen & Reilly, 2001
Wallsten and Budescu (1983) state that there is one axiom for a rational belief structure 
that leads to an additive probability measure, representative of a coherent opinion, and on
that doesn’t. An axiom system that doesn’t lead to an additive probability measure 
to the lack of perfect sensitivity, a feature of human judgment, which is basically the 
reality that a subject is not capable of making infinitely fine judgments and therefor
cannot place order to events that are close in relative likelihood. Lindley, Tversky, a
Brown (1979) explore the reconciliation of assessments that are contradictory to th
of probability, or incoherent probability assessments. Some examples of this incoherence
are probability assessments that are not additive or have conditional probability ratios th
do not coincide with the corresponding unconditional probability ratios. They develo
two approaches, an internal and external, to solve the reconciliation problem. “In the 
internal approach, the observed probability assessments are related to internal coherent 
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 probabilities in a manner analogous to the relation between the observed score and the true 
score in test theory” (Lindley et al, 1979 p.149). Thus the internal approach is concerned 
with attempting to approximate the “true” probabilities using the observed assessments. 
The external approach is only concerned with deriving coherent probabilities using the
original set of incoherent assessments instead of addressing any “true” probabilities. 
 The basic model for both approaches contains:
 
 one subject that will be providing 
the judgments and is not necessarily coherent (S), an uncertain event under consideration 
 distribution for A (π(A)), a vector that describes the assessed values 
ubjects 
al 
s 
π | 
 The internal approach provides a complete probabilistic description of q and π 
because N is only concerned with π and q
(A), a probability
(q(A)), and an investigator who is coherent (N) and is tasked with reconciling the s
stated values of the observed measurements (q) and providing an assessment of the true 
measurements (π). The investigator is concerned with the true measurements in the intern
approach and the world external to the subject in the external approach. The investigator N 
could assess his own probabilities, denoted p(·) and thus provide a joint probability 
distribution of the uncertain quantities. The joint probability is described in three stage
with each corresponding to a different aspect of N’s contemplation of the problem; first, 
there is a distribution A, p(A), second, there is a conditional distribution of π given A, p(
A), and third, there is a conditional distribution of q given the other two elements, p(q | π, 
A). Basically, p(A) can be seen as N’s appreciation of the world, p(π | A) as N’s opinion of 
S’s knowledge of the world, and p(q | π) as N’s opinion of S as an assessor.  
: ∑= ApApp )()|()( ππ , where ∑A is the 
A
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 summation over a partition of events in A.  Using Bayes theorem 
provides, )()|()|( πππ pqpqp ∝ , which is N’s appraisal of S after S has reported his 
assessments q and can be used when the subject has made several incoherent probability 
judgments and wishes to reconcile them to coherent values. With the direct form for the
internal approach, i.e. using p(π) and p(q | π) to obtain p(π | q), π is the set of paramete
 
rs, q 
 the d
ost 
 nt belief concerning the true measure of 
use of the concept of a true score. Wallsten 
 their version of a true score incorporates the subject 
ent based on current knowledge and information at hand a large 
numb ry of each previous judgment) and the provided 
by a series of statisticall
is ata, and the “prior” p(π) is updated by the likelihood p(q | π) to give a posterior 
probability p(π | q). The technique of sending the whole argument through with log-odds 
instead of probabilities, because the q’s cannot be normally distributed, becomes the m
usable method for reconciliation. This is partly because log-odds are more convenient and 
sensible to work with than probabilities.  In addition, log-odds are necessary to handle 
bivariate distributions and it’s more reasonable to assume that the measurement error has 
constant variance when expressed in log-odds. The technique only then requires the 
addition of the variances and covariances of q, because they describe the normal 
likelihood, and an assumption that the prior is “flat.”   
Wallsten and Budescu (1983) have a differe
a subject and thus a different approach for the 
and Budescu (1983) explain that
providing an assessm
er of times (with no memo
distribution would define the true score of that subject. Thus the true score t, is the 
expected value of the distribution obtained y independent 
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 assessments made by a subject. So instead of assuming a set of int
probabilit ependent probability assessments will provide 
distributions with well-defined expected values termed the true subjective probabilities fo
that subject, the specific task, and particular situation.  
The external approach provides a probabilistic description of q and A because here 
ernal subjective 
ies, they assume that ind
r 
N is only concerned with q and A: ∑=
π
theorem we obtain )()|()|( ApAqpqAp ∝ , which can be used when the investigator is a 
decision maker in need of a probability for A for a decision to be made. The internal 
approach is deemed simpler than the external approach because p(π) can be assessed 
directly and it does not need to use p(π | A), nor the derived probability p(q | A).  
 Lindley et al. (1979) also provide a least squares procedure with the internal 
approach in which they are only concerned with the subject’s stated and coherent values 
ππ )|()|()|( ApqpAqp . Again, using Bayes 
for some events, q and π. With this, the reconciled values )|(ˆ qE are approximated iiπ = π
by the values of the π’s that minimize∑ −
i
iiq
2)( π .  And in other situations, the q’s will 
jiiijbe correlated with different vari qqw ππ −−ances, when the quadratic form )()( j∑ is 
e 
s of the 
e 
lly non-
linear resulting in non-linear equations. There also comes a consideration of a metric (e.g. 
minimized subject to the w’s being weights. Minimization is performed by equating th
first derivatives to zero, thus providing the approximate variances and covariance
reconciled values from the inverted minimized matrix of second derivatives. The on
difficulty associated with the procedure is that the coherence constraints are typica
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 probability metric, log-odds metric, etc.) when using the least squares application b
the variance of the q’s may be more constant in one metric versus another.  An alt
to changing the metric for precision purposes is for either S or N to provide the precision, 
“the degree to which it varies upon further reflection”, a
ecause 
ernative 
ssociated with the values (Lindley 
et al, 1979 p.156).  For example, the likelihood that that a coin will come up heads is very 
precise as it will not likely differ from 0.5.   
 Lindley (1982) explores the option of better understanding the assessment 
mechanism to improve the probability assessments. Lindley first notes that an investigator 
(N) is not essential to process the subject’s (S) evaluations as in his previous work, though 
having it is not unreasonable. The question asked by Lindley is whether q, the log-odds for 
uncertain event A, can be transformed to a better log-odds assessment q*. The subject’s 
bility 
A. The only case however where 
 from the log
A ()1/()(log[* 01 qfqfq
probability appraisal can be described as, if A( ¯A) is true, let fi(q)[ f0(q)] be the proba
that S will give log-odds q. Thus, for a subject who is excellent at assessing, q will be 
positive and large under A, and negative and large under ¯
N will believe S is when q* = q: which -odds assessment for 
, )]γ γ−= , is when q=− γγ , or when log-odds (A | q) 
= q. Thus, S is probability calibrated, when the frequency and assessed probability agree, if 
q), 
2 2
eqfqf )()1/()( 01
this occurs. More generally, S is probability calibrated if there is a change from q to q*.  
 The example provided by Lindley (1982) for this is to let γ = ½ and f1(q) = f0(-
so that S is just as likely to say p for the probability of A when A is true, as 1-p for A when 
¯A is true, furthermore suppose f1(q) is N(μ,σ ), so that f0(-q) is N(-μ,σ ). Then the 
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 improved assessment will be the original assessment multiplied by 2μ/σ2, 
22222 /2/)(
2
1/)(
2
1* σμσμσμ qqqq =++−−= . Now, q* will be N(μ ,σ1 1 1 
2μ2/σ2 and σ 2 = 4μ2/σ2 under A, and since 2μ  /σ 2 = 1, so that S is probability calibrated, 
2
 Basically, the subject may believe that he has biases (fi(q)) that might affect his 
judgments.  However, the distributions can be updated once the subject learns the truth 
bject 
e 
 use it and make 
rections to the readings acco st like the previously d
if 
the subject is calibrated for one value of γ, N’s probability for the event, he will not be 
calibrated for a different value.  This difficulty can be overcome with French’s (1980) idea 
that the distributions f (q) might depend on γ. Lindley’s example for this is the supposition 
2) with μ = 
1 1 1
the original assessment is only probability calibrated when 2μ = σ .  
about such events and therefore the basic assessments are improved because the su
learns about his own prejudices.  An advantage of having an investigator, and identifying 
him with the subject, is that the idea of an infinite regress is avoided. However, a difficulty 
that arises when the subject and investigator are identified is that as soon as the subject 
learns about fi(q) he will most likely adjust his assessment procedure. As for changing th
assessment procedure, the subject might continue to assess as before and then transform 
the assessments based on the noted bias or he might adjust the actual procedure. An 
example provided by Lindley (1982) of these two options is that a surveyor might 
recognize a bias in his theodolite (a measuring instrument) but continue to
cor rdingly, ju iscussed example where S 
transformed to q*, or he might make an adjustment to the actual theodolite.  
 A connected difficulty in having the investigator separate from the subject is that 
i
 62
 that the subject was informed that for a series of almanac type questions th
ing correct three quarters of the time. 
q q
e suggested 
answers were at random with the upper answer be
Reasonably, this information should affect the f’s. Therefore, the original log-odds 
equation, , would become , and 
calibration for all γ would be possible.  Lindley supplies an exam
σδμγ + σδμγ +−
eqfqf =− )()1/()( 01 γγ eqfqf =− )|()1/()|( 01 γγγγ
ple where 
),(~)|(1 Nqf and ),(~)|(0 Nqf , with )]1/(log[
2 2 γγδ −= , the initia
log-odds for A. Verifying S to be calibrated for all γ with 2μ = σ , thus under the same 
conditions as before, is fairly easy.  Normally, when the subject is asked to assess the 
probability for an unknown event, like the almanac questions, it is not described in a way 
that would favor its truth or falsity, and γ = ½. However, if the subject feels that the 
questioner phrased the event in a way that even though it appears to be true, it is more 
likely to be false, a catch is implicated and γ < ½. Lindley proves this suggestion with an 
example involving the relative latitude coordinates of places in Europe and North Am
since subjects generally do not realize how far north Europe really is.   
  
5.3. Decomposition 
Ravinder, Kleinmuntz, and Dyer (1988) targeted their article around how an 
l 
2
erica; 
analyst can 
 
three different scenarios where decomposition is appropriate: thinking about how the event 
reduce inconsistency by relying on decomposition rather than direct elicitation by 
establishing the impact of the decomposition procedure on the reliability of the assessed
probabilities. Decomposition is the process of breaking down a probability assessment into 
smaller or manageable chunks (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).  Clemen and Reilly recognize 
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 in question is related to other events, thinking about what uncertain outcomes could lead
the event in question occurring, and/or thinking about what uncertain outcomes must 
happen for the event in question to occur. Clemen and Reilly (2001) also state that t
decomposition to use is the one that is easiest to c  most 
transparent view of the uncertainty in question.  Ravinder et al (1988) regard
omplex  judgment 
problems.  The decomposition approach is able to capture the relationship between the 
event in question, the target event, and its background events (e.g. the survivability of a 
patient may depend on the disease they had, the strength of the patient, the complexity of 
For example, the different distributions of the survivability of the patient just mentione
could be assessed conditionally upon the outcome of the disease they had, or conditional 
upon the occurrence of multiple events (e.g. the disease the patient had was non-
significant, the complexity of the surgery was minuscule, and the patient’s strength was 
 to 
he best 
ontemplate and that gives the
 
decomposition as a useful technique for reducing the c ity of challenging
the medical procedure performed, etc.) with conditional probabilities of the target event. 
d 
favorable). The broken down judgments are later combined using an aggregation rule 
iderations, i.e. the law of total probability provides a convenient 
method.  The example provided by Ravinder et al (1988) is to denote the probability of the 
B1,…, 
based upon statistical cons
target event as A and assume it is assessed conditional upon its background events 
BBn. The event BiB
exclusive and exhaustive partition of the relevant event space, meaning it must encompass 
 can be a single event or a scenario and the set must form a mutually 
all possible background events that could/would lead to the target event, and 
thus:∑= =i iB1 1)Pr( . So the probability of the target event would n
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 be: ∑
=
allsten and 
 a 
 In order to compare decomposition to direct assessment, the probability of the 
n
i 1
i i
i i
=
n
i 1
)Pr()|Pr()Pr( . Obviously, elicitation by decomposition is more laborious 
than direct assessment, because a marginal and conditional probability must be assessed 
for each background event.  
 Ravinder et al (1988) use the psychometric framework developed by W
Budescu (1983) for evaluating the accuracy of probability encoding. The proposed model 
is as follows: each encoded probability is considered a random variable, x, composed of
fixed true measure, t, and a variable error, e, such that x = t + e.  There is importance of 
noting and maintaining the distinction between random and systematic sources of error 
when working with this model, because an analysis of reliability is only concerned with 
random errors and does not address errors that are observed to be consistent, predictable 
differences in the true scores.  
target event can be rewritten as ∑= iibca  with the direct assessment, denoted a, the 
components of the decomposition estimate, denoted a’, the conditional probabilities of the 
background events, denoted Pr(A|B ) = c , and marginal probabilities of the background 
events, denoted Pr(B ) = b . Now the measurement model can be applied both to the direct 
assessment and the decomposition estimate components, such that for the direct 
assessment, '''
ii BBAA
=
δα +=a , where α’ is the true score and δ’ is the random error with its 
standard error of measurement (SEM) denoted by σ . In addition, marginal probabilities of 0
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 the iibackground events areb δβ +i =
probabilities of the background events are c
, with each SEM denoted by σi, and conditional 
iii = γ + ε , with each SEM denoted by τi. 
Ravinder et al (1988) do not accep ption provided by Wallsten and 
Budescu, that random errors are uncorrelated, because they argue that marginal 
n 
d 
decomposition estimate, E(a), can be derived from , and with the 
assumption of independence between the errors in the 
t the additional assum
probabilities cannot be completely independent since they must sum to one to be coherent 
and errors in the elicitation of the conditional probabilities could be correlated due to the 
anchoring and adjusting heuristic discussed in chapter three. Thus, correlations for the 
errors in the marginal elicitations, denoted φij, are accepted in lieu of independence and, i
addition, the errors in the condition elicitations may be correlated, denoted by ρij.  
 The set of equations previously noted can be used to obtain the expected value an
variance of the decomposition estimate (Ravinder et al, 1988). The expected value of the 
∑
=
=
n
i
iibcEaE
1
)()(
ci and bi terms, ∑= n
=
iiEaE )()( βγ . 
If the estimates of the various probabilities are unbiased, because of the assumption that 
the random error terms have expected values of 0, the expected value of the decomposition 
estimate (previous equation) should be equal to the expected value of the direct 
assessment, earlier equated a’. The decomposition estimate error variance is denoted 
by, , and with the help of the adjusted target event equation, the variance can 
n
i
n
j
n
i = ==
i 1
be rewritten as the sum of a set of covariances, ),()(2 jjiiiid bcbcCovbcVar ∑∑∑ ==σ . 
( ) 2daVar σ=
1 11
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 Using the idea that ci and b e independent errors, a general formula for the 
decomposition error is produced: 
ijij
n
jjiiij
n n
jjiiij
n n
jjiid ρϕτστσρτβτβϕσγσγσ ∑∑∑∑∑∑ ++=2 ))(())(())(( .  
denoted:
i terms hav
i ji j = == == = 1 11 11 1
 Ravinder et al address the question of the relative sizes of the errors associated with 
direct elicitation and decomposition with a comparison of the SEM of direct elicitation to 
the SEM of decomposition.  The percent change due to decomposition, 
i
n
j
1
00
0 −== σ
− σ
σ
σσπ dd , can express the relative size of the measurement errors. If 
π = 0, then there are identical levels of measurement error for both techniques. If a 
n e value is produced, there is an improvement due to decomposition, and a positive 
value indicates that “decomposition is inferior to direct assessment” (Ravinder et al, 1988 
p.195). Deriving upper and lower bounds for π can b mative when 
can considerably reduce the potential error, especially if the componen  
be more precisely assessed than the target event (direct assessment).  
 Ravinder et al (1988) conclude with some recommendations about structuring 
probability encoding tasks that will minimize inconsistency: decomposition can 
random errors associated with probability encodings; error reduction has an upward lim
and dditional probabilities will not be necessary to obtain further reduction; the
probabilities that cover an extremely wide range
egativ
e extremely infor
comparing the amount of error associated with each technique. In general, decomposition 
t probabilities can
reduce 
it 
 assessing a  
conditioning events marginal probabilities should be selected to be equal; conditional 
 of values should be avoided; the 
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 component probability assessment errors should be as small as possible; and the analy
should try to maintain independen
st 
ce of the component assessments. Finally, a 
decomposition approach is simple (conceptually), is implemented easily, and apparently 
has great potential for error reduction.     
dinating these 
s can be lessened with
on the concept of influence diagrams and captures the relevant knowledge of an event. An 
influence diagram represents the actions a decision maker may take and the information 
possessed at the time of the decision by way of decision nodes (boxes representing an 
action to be taken), chance nodes (circles representing an uncertain event), and arrows 
(showing connectivity between the events). A knowledge map is also another method for 
decomposing a complex uncertain event into workable and more easily understood units.   
 Howard (1989) uses the Tversky and Kahneman (1973) study of Tom W. to prove 
his point on how knowledge maps (decomposition) can aid in correcting the representative 
heuristic. As previously reviewed in chapter two, the Tom W. study presents a high school 
description of Tom implying that he is introverted, mechanically minded, lacking in 
creativity, and well organized to a group of students who are supposed to assess the 
likelihood that Tom would be enrolled in a specific field of graduate study.  Generally, the 
assessors relate Tom to being a “nerd” and subsequently place him into the field of 
computer science or engineering without regard to the relative enrollment populations of 
 Howard (1989) continues with the idea of decomposition in his work.  He notes 
that information is generally received fragmentally by an analyst when it comes from an 
expert or a group of experts, and the daunting task of gathering and coor
fragment  the use of knowledge maps.  A knowledge map is centered 
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 each field of study.  Howard (1989) first suggests decomposing this problem into assessin
the likelihood that a student would be in each field of study and the likelihood o
report such as Tom’s given he is in each field of study.  Next the assessors are to multiply
the two likelihoods together and then norm
g 
f having a 
 
alize to yield a posterior distribution on the 
es 
 
ed 
 
aduate 
 
different fields. This first step provides an improvement step in understanding but still do
not capture all that is relevant to the second probability, that a report like Tom’s would be
in a given field.  Howard believes that the remaining relevant information can be captur
with three considerations: is Tom’s personality now different than in high school (when the 
report was completed), are there any validity issues with the report itself, and is personality
a good indicator of field of study. Figure 5.2, provided by Howard (1989, p.912), is the 
corresponding knowledge map that captures these three considerations.  
 
Despite the fact that this knowledge map encompasses all the necessary 
information for determining the likelihood, it does not reflect the notion that an individual 
might not feel comfortable trying to assess the relevance of present personality to gr
field because they do not think about characterizing the personalities of graduate students.
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 Yet assessing the probability distribution on field of study and what is known about the 
personalities of graduate students in each field is probably more comfortable for most 
assessors, because people do think of graduate students by field. Thus, the redundancy map
in Figure 5.3, provided by Howard (1989, p.913), is created to represent this more 
comfortable way of thinking. The assessments for the original knowledge map (figure 5.
can now be determined by using the new assessments from figure 5.3 iter
 
2) 
atively until the 
arrow from
 
ion maker 
ent. 
The corresponding example provided by Howard (1989) is for a subject to be interested in 
assessi room.  To 
Personality Now distributions agree and then performing the Bayesian reversal of the 
 Graduate Field to Personality Now.  
“A knowledge map represents a possible assessment order for the joint distribution 
on the uncertain quantities (events) it contains”, and in some instances the decis
is only interested in the joint distribution of a few of the events (Howard, 1989 p.918). For 
these such instances constructing a disjoint knowledge map can simplify the assessm
ng a probability distribution on the income of the next person to enter the 
aid in thinking about this particular assessment, the subject might want to consider the 
amount of education the person has had and even the age of the individual. With these 
additional events however comes additional assessments and the subject is only interested 
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 in the distribution on income, thus the subject 
would want to draw the corresponding 
disjoint knowledge map represented in figure 
5.4, provided by Howard (1989, p.920). The 
arrow), ∫= a aaee &}|&}{|{&}|{ , multiplying by an assessed distribution on income given 
education, and summing over education. As Howard suggests, creating disjoint knowledge
maps can reduce the difficult task of assessment to manageable pieces. One problem w
disjoint knowledge maps however, is that they on
subject can now assess a distribution on age 
r on education given age, multiply 
, and then sum age to obtain a 
distribution on education.  Finally, the desired distribution on income can be obtained by 
substituting this distribution into the equation for deriving education (point of large 
and anothe
them
 
ith 
ly represent one point in the spectrum 
 
t 
and they do not provide all the consistency checks and inferences of a complete knowledge 
map. Yet overall, knowledge maps permit assessing beyond direct assessment, and the use 
of redundant and disjoint knowledge maps “can often reconcile the needs of consistency 
and convenience” (Howard, 1989 p.921).  
Moskowitz and Sarin (1983) are more focused on the elicitation and additional 
problems associated with the elicitation of conditional probabilities instead of marginal 
probabilities because the elicitation of conditional probabilities presents extra problems
that are not encountered in marginal probability assessment. In their article, they presen
these difficulties (produced due to the heuristics described in chapter 3) and provide 
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 suggestions for improvement in the assessment procedure such as 
judgmental aid. They suggest that these
the causal versus diagnostic and positive versu
events. It was determined that the probability jud
perceived to be causal, in assessing p(B | A), A
or nonoccurrence of event B, rather than diagn
This is because individuals perceive
positive relationship, the knowledge of A occurring should increase the probability of B 
occurring, between the events led to larger conditional probability assignments than 
negative re jects also felt that a positive relation was more 
informative. Normatively speaking however, neither the causality/diagnostic relationship 
nor the positive/negative relationship should influence the conditional probability 
assignments. These effects are noted in the study reviewed below. 
 Moskowitz and Sarin (1983) performed a case study in which each subject, an 
undergraduate enrolled in managerial statistics with a knowledge of the concept 
probabilities, assumed the role of a bank lending officer who was given the base rate 
probabilities of delinquency, p(D), good or bad credit probabilities 
the introduction of a 
 additional assessment difficulties are affected by 
s negative relationships of the assessed 
gments are larger if the relationship is 
 is perceived as the cause of the occurrence 
ostic, if B is perceived as the cause of A. 
 a causal relation as more informative. In addition, a 
a 
lationship because sub
p(G) and p(B) 
respective
rginal 
ly, and was to assess the conditional probabilities p(D|B), p(B|D), and p(D|G). 
The subjects first specified their perceptions of the relationship strengths between 
delinquency and credit rating on a scale, they then assessed conditional probabilities for 15 
questions partitioned into 5 groupings with reasoning as to how they arrived at their 
assessments, the subjects were then given a Joint Probability Table (JPT) with the ma
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 event probabilities included as an assessment aid, with which the subjects reassessed 
several of the previous questions, and finally they rated the JPT as an assessment aid on a 
scale with descriptions as to how it helped.   
 Each group’s questions were designed to test the consistency with respect to the 
probability axioms that must be satisfied for a conditional probability, say p(B | A): 
1)|( ≤ABp , 
)(
)()|( BpABp ≤ , 
Ap )(
1)()()|( ApBpABp
Ap
−+≥ , and 0)|( ≥ABp .  The resu
showed that a number of violations were observed with possible causes being that the 
subjects ignored the based rate frequency of the events (the base rate bias) and the causal 
versus diagnostic and positive versus negative relationships. For this study, wher
event of interest is delinquency D, if the event B is bad credit rating then the event B is a 
causal datum, and conversely, the event B is a diagnostic datum if D is perceived as the 
cause of B. Thus, if B → D and p(D) = Cp(B), then p(D|B) > Cp(B|D
lts 
e the 
→” denotes ), where “
the direction of causality, C is a constant, and p(D|B) and p(B|D) are assessed directly. 
Once again, the causal relationship led to more revisions and higher conditional 
assessments than did the diagnostic and there shouldn’t be a difference.  For this study, a 
positive relationship between events B and D implies that knowledge of B should increase 
the probability of D occurring and therefore
)(
)()|()()|(
Bp
GpGDpDpBDp −> , where G 
denotes a good credit rating, and p(D|B) and p(D|G) are directly assessed probabilities.  
 With the addition of the JPT, the subjects tended to have more confidence in the 
marginal probability assessments and were more likely to revise their conditional 
probability assessments.  The results from the study suggested that the use of the JPT 
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 drastically improved the consistency, reduced the frequency of the violations of the 
conditions, and also lessened the effects of the causality/diagnostic and positive/negative 
relationships. However, if the JPT is not used properly, the conditional probabilities can be 
l.  
er 
order probabilities can be thwarted by appropriate bounding y suggest th
assessments of marginal and pairwise conditional probabilities are sufficient because they 
ded 
1 2 n
i
inconsistent. Generally though, the subjects indicated that the JPT was in fact a useful too
In addition, Moskowitz and Sarin (1983) prove that the task of assessing high
.  The at the 
alone place a very tight bound on the scenario probabilities. However, if they do not 
provide a tight enough bound and further precision on the estimation of the scenario 
probabilities is needed, higher order probabilities must be assessed. The example provi
by Moskowitz and Sarin is the consideration of n binary events, e , e ,…, e , thus there 
exists N = 2n combinations of occurrence or nonoccurrence, and the assessment of 
probabilities would require N – 1 judgments from an expert. If only the marginal and 
pairwise conditional probabilities are known, then the lower and upper bounds of the 
probabilities can be induced by the linear programs: Min x  s.t. Xx∈ and Max x  
s.t. Xx∈ respectively where only p  and p  = p(e  / e ) · p  for i = 1 to n, j > i, are specified. 
One basic possible alternative for this formula is that with simple modification, the bounds 
on a subset of scenarios can be easily determ n study 
indicated that only having only the marginal and pairwise conditional probabilities may be 
i
i ij i j i
ined. The results of one simulatio
ed to 
sufficient in many applications.  However, in some situations the marginal and pairwise 
conditional probabilities may not provide tight enough bounds and higher order 
probabilities will need to be assessed, meaning, in the constraint set X the pijk’s will ne
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 be assessed. The example provided is the consideration of a 3 event case, p123, where
bounds are obtained by solving eight equations in the constraint set X and by restricting 
each x
 the 
i ≥ 0. The bounds that facilitate the assessment of higher order probabilities are: 
)()(1,,, 231312321231312123 pppppppppp +++++−≤ , 
0),(),(),( 323132231211312 ppppppppp123p −+−+−+ , so that if  p≥ 3 
12 13 23 123  of the 
i ij
y 
e 
1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.2, p
= 0.9, p  = 0.1, p  = 0.45, and p  = 0.18, then 0.08 ≤ p  ≤ 0.1.  “The mean values
bounds in the simulation study were considerably smaller because the bounds decrease 
rapidly with the variations in p ’s and p ’s” (Moskowitz & Sarin, 1983 p.747). 
These were only some of the methods used to improve assessments provided b
experts during probability elicitation for decision analysis. The subsequent chapter will 
review scoring rules, which is a method used to encourage honesty from subjects who ar
providing assessments. 
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 CHAPTER 6 Scoring Rules 
ied 
to encourage more accurate and honest forecasting.  Most of the literature uses weather 
forecasting as their research for measuring improvement w
 
etric) is 
describ
 rules. 
 Scoring rules are put in place to encourage a subject to reveal his true opinion and 
thus make his probability assessments correspond with his judgment (Matheson & 
Winkler, 1976). Scoring rules can be used to either evaluate the assessor by measuring the 
goodness of the assessments (an ex post sense), or aid in the elicitation process by 
encouraging the assessor to be careful in making assessments (an ex ante sense).  Scoring 
rules typically are set to overcome motivational biases, anchoring, and overconfidence. 
Matheson and Winkler (1976) explain how to perform the generation of a scoring 
rule for a binary probability assessment.  Consider the event E and a subject who assigns 
probability p to the occurrence of the event, but when asked to reveal his assessment 
provides a probability r which may not be equal to p. A scoring rule S(r) provides the 
 
 This chapter will review the concepts of scoring rules and how they can be appl
ith these methods. Matheson 
and Winkler (1976) will provide the methods used for scoring discrete and continuous 
probability distributions. A continuation of the subject involving utilities is presented by
Kadane and Winkler (1988).  The use of asymmetric scoring rules (versus symm
ed in detail by Winkler (1994). The use of scoring rules in coordination with 
incentive plans for big business is provided by Sarin and Winkler (1980). And finally, 
Lichtendahl and Winkler (2007) show how competition between forecasters provides 
different uses of scoring
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 subject a payoff S(r) = S1(r) if the event occurs and S(r) = S (r) if the event does not occur. 
Thus the subject’s expected payoff for the binary situation is 
(( rS
 be 
r, 
he 
2
)()1()() 21 rSprpSE −+= and the scoring rule is strictly proper if E(S(p)) > E(S(r)) 
for r ≠ p. So for a subject to maximize the expected score, the reported forecast r should
equal to the probability p, meaning the subject should be honest in his reporting (Winkle
1994).  
Averages can be determined when using scoring rules to perform ex post 
evaluations (versus using them during the elicitation process to promote honesty) 
(Winkler, 1994). Winkler explains that over a series of assessments procedures with t
same value r given as the forecast, the average score is 
)
)()1()()( 21 rSfrfSrS f −+=  
where f is the relative frequency of E on those occasions and is strictly proper if 
)()( rSfS >  for fr ≠ . “That is, over the sff et of occasions with forecast value r, 
)(rS f
when f = r, the forecaster is perfectly calibrated (Winkler, 1994 p.1396).  As a result for 
forecasters who are well calibrated the equation can be simplified to 
is maximized when the probability forecast r equals the relative frequency f” and 
)()1()()( 21 rSrrrSrS −+= . Sharpness in probabilities is rewarded with strictly proper 
scoring rules and almost all scoring rules used in practice are symmetric in the sense that 
1 rS = )1(2 rS − for all ]1,0[∈r . This implies that )( )(rS  is symmetric with a minimum 
value when r = ½ and a maximum value when r = 0 or 1, and for that reason the average 
scores are smallest for forecasts around ½ and biggest for forecasts around 0 or 1, and
thereby gratifying greater sharpness through higher average scores. For the instance wh
 
en 
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 the same value of r is not given over different occasions, g(r) denotes the proportion of 
occasions that the value r is used in a series of forecasts and f(
vent on the occasions for which a forecast of r is given an
thus the overall average score is now 
r) denotes the relative 
frequency of occurrence of the e d 
∑ ∑ −+== rf rgrSrfrSrfrgrSS )()}()](1[)()({)()( 21)( . Now for f(r) = r for all r, or 
r r
perfect calibration, ∑ −−=
r
rgrrS )()]1(1[ and sharpness is again rewarded via S  because 
values 
rete probability distribution 
(Matheson & Winkler, 1976). To do so, let E  represent the ith event (or ith value of a 
random variable), where  and I is finite or countably infinite. Also, let pi and ri 
correspond to previous p  in the binary situation, and lastly suppose S(r1, r2, …) 
provid j 1 2 j
jj
a distribution g of forecasts r with values of r close to 0 or 1 given more often and 
close to ½ not given as much will yield a higher average score.  
Scoring rules can also be generalized to any disc
i
Ii∈
 and r
es the subject’s payoff S (r , r , …) if E  occurs. 
Then, ,...),(,...)),(( rrSprrSE
Ij
∑ 2121 = , and S is strictly proper if 
∈
when r  ≠ p  for any ,...)),((,...)),(( 2121 rrSEppSE > Ii∈i i .  
There are several forms of strictly proper scoring rules that have been developed 
and the three most encountered examples are the quadratic, ∑
∈
2 e −=
Ii
ijj rrrrS 21 2,...),( , th
logarithmic, jj rrrS log,...),( 21 = , and the spherical, 2/1221 )/(,...),( ∑
∈
= ijj rrrrS  scoring 
Ii
rules. Matheson and Winkler (1976) note that scoring rules can easily be extended to a 
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 continuous state by limiting arguments. Thus, if x is the value of the variable of interest 
and r(x) is the density function assessed by the subject, the continuous quadratic func
is ∫∞−= dxxrxrxrS )()(2))(( 2 , the logarithmic functions is )(log))(( xrxrS
tion 
∞− = , and the 
probabilistic weather forecasts ering the quadratic rule 
2
1 )1(1)( rrS −−=  and 22 1)( rrS −= , the average score is expressed as 
spherical function is .  
The Brier sc
 (Winkler, 1994). If consid
∫∞∞−= 2/12 ))(/()())(( dxxrxrxrS
ore is an example of a quadratic scoring rule that is used to evaluate 
2)()1(1)( frffrS f −−−−= with the last term rewarding calibration by penalizing 
would then be
deviations from perfect calibration. For perfect calibrated forecasters the average score 
)1(1)( rrrS −−=
0 or 1 towards ½ and thereby rewarding shar
 is not given over diff
ed in a series of forecasts and 
i
erage score is now
, with the last term penalizing assessments that move from 
pness. For the instance when the same value 
of r erent occasions, g(r) denotes the proportion of occasions that the 
value r is us f(r) denotes the relative frequency of occurrence 
of the event on the occas ons for which a forecast of r is given and thus the overall 
quadratic av ∑ −−−−= rfrf [(1)[(1{
r
rgrfrS )(})]()] 2 . Now for f(r) = 
r for all r, or perfect calibration, ∑ −−=
r
from utilities ree elicitation proced use of 
scoring rules. Kadane and Winkler focus on an event A, with )|( Afg and 
rgrrS )()]1(1[ .  
Kadane and Winkler (1988) are focused on the separation of probability elicitation 
and they review th ures, one of which is the 
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 )|( Afg representing the probability distributions of the expert’s fortune given A and it’
complement
s 
A , with U denoting the expert’s utility function for his or her fortune. Kadane
an t the no-stakes condition whi e instance
 
d Winkler (1988) also presen ch is built upon th  
when no part of the expert’s fortune is contingent on whether A occurs or not, thus a 
condition where c = 1 meaning, )|()|( AfgAfg = for all f. “Independence of f and the 
events or variables for which probabilities are being elicited can be thought of in terms of 
the expert having no stakes in these events or variables other than stakes that might be 
created as part of the elicitation process through lotteries or other devices” (Kadane & 
Winkler, 1988 p.358).  
ne 
ho tell us that the
 
 p would therefore be: 
The scoring rule elicitation method is the second method to be reviewed by Kada
and Winkler, w  expert will receive a payoff equal to a score S from a 
scoring rule that is strictly proper if and only if the reported value is exactly the expert’s 
probability, denoted π. They use the quadratic strictly proper scoring rule, 2)( pxrS −−= , 
where p is the expert’s stated probability of A, r is a positive constant, and x is an indicator 
variable corresponding to the occurrence (x=1) or nonoccurrence (x=0) of A. The ex
expected utility as a function of
pert’s
∫ ∫ −−+−−= dfAfgrpfUdfAfgprfUpEU )|()()1()|(])1([)( 22 ππ
would then set the derivative of EU(p), with respect to p, equal to 0 to ma
expected utility. Thus,  
. The expert 
ximize the 
0)|()(')1()|(])1([')1( 22 =−−+−−− ∫ ∫ dfAfgrpfUpdfAfgprfUp ππ would 
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 simplify to with )1/()1/( ππ −=− cpp ∫
∫
−
−−
dfAfgrpfU
dfAfgprfU
)|()('
)|(])1([' 2
meaning U is linear, then the expert’s stated probability p will equal π. However, without 
linearity, such as for a risk averse individual whose U’ is strictly decreasing, the no st
condition will not be sufficient f g rules. Consequently, a risk averse 
subject who satisfies
=c
2
. Now if c = 1, 
akes 
or c = 1 with scorin
)|()|( AfgAfg = will have c < 1 when π > ½ and c > 1 when π < ½
resulting in p moving away from π toward ½. And for a risk seeking subject, the movem
would be in the opposite direction, moving toward 0 when π < ½ and toward 1 when π > ½ 
with the possibility of m
 
ent 
oving all the way to p = 0 or 1 for extremists.  
limit, 
When the payoff from the scoring rule is of little consequence or when r 
approaches 0, the no-stakes condition is sufficient for c = 1 to hold approximately. The 
dfAfgfU
dfAfgfU
cc
r )|()('
)|()('
0 ∫lim 0
∫ , will equal 1 if the no-stakes condition holds. ==→
Expanding c in a Taylor series in r around 0, Kadane and Winkler (1988) find that 
)( 210 rOrccc ++= , where 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+−−= ∫
∫
∫
∫
dfAfgfU
dfA
p
dfAfgfU
pcc
)|()('
)|
)|()('
)1( 2201 . Therefore from these two 
fgfUdfAfgfU ()(")|()("
equations, )()]}()()1[(1{ 2220 rOwEpwEprcc AA hh +−−+= , with 
)('/)(")( fUfUfw −= , ∫= dfAfgfUAfgfUfhA )|()('/)|()(')( , and 
∫= dfAfgfUAfgfUfhA )|()('/)|()(')( .  When U is exponential with 0)( >= wfw , 
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 )(])21(1[ 20 0
have stronger assumptions for obtainment.  In addition, c can differ substantially from 1 if 
the no-stakes condition is not satisfied.   
Winkler (1994) presents an argument that symmetric rules aren’t always an 
appropriate reward st  presents a set of tailor-able asymmetric rules. 
When comparing forecasters the scores obtained are meant to compare the skill of the 
forecaster but instead they also depend on the current situation the forecaster is in. For 
example, forecasters who are located in very dry climates can be very re
rOwprcc +−+=  and when r is small, c > c0 if π < ½ and c < c  if π > ½. 
Thus, the no-stakes condition by itself is not sufficient for c = 1 making it necessary to 
ructure and he then
fined because they 
can giv ster 
t 
be able to predict precipitation likelihood close to zero or one on very many days.  Winkler 
(1994) develops a set of “skill scores” to help produce an average score that reflects the 
t 
situation.  These wo tralize the situation’s contribution by comparing a forecaster’s 
average score to the average score that a forecasting scheme, i.e. climatology, would 
obtain. The most common weather forecasting skill score is the 
over climatology in the average score, thus corresponding to a scoring rule S, 
e precipitation predictions close to zero on multiple days, whereas a foreca
located in an area with a higher annual rainfall or unpredictable weather patterns may no
ability of the forecaster instead of a combination of the forecaster’s skill and curren
rk to neu
percentage improvement 
where ClSClCl SSSSkill /)( −= is the average score for climatology. The skill score does 
have two shortcomings; even if S is strictly proper, the skill score is no erefore 
not necessarily reward calibration and sharp rule, and a 
linear transformation of S can alter the values of the skill score which limits the skill score 
t and will th
ness as would a strictly proper 
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 from being viewed as a standa s 
 
rdized measure. However, if differences in average score
are considered instead of percentage improvement, the strictly proper nature of S will be
maintained by the skill score, e.g. ClSSSkill −= .  
The main goal of Winkler (1994) is to develop strictly proper scoring rules that are 
standar . they 
s 
 to 
dized, that will differ from previous rules because they are not symmetric (i.e
will not satisfy )1()( 21 rSrS −= ), and will have the capability to represent an evaluator’
judgments about the associated difficulty of each forecasting situation. The benchmark
measure by, denoted c, could be a base rate such as climatology or based on a utility of 
forecasts in a decision problem, and when the forecast of c is given, unless its c = 0.5, the 
scoring rule must be asymmetric to achieve a minimum average score. To generate a 
family of strictly proper asymmetric scoring rules, define for any symmetric rule S and 
)1,0(∈c , )(/)]()([)( cTcSrSrS −=∗ where T(c) = {S1(1) - S1(c) if r ≥ c, and S2(0) – S2(c) 
if r ≤ c. Therefore S* is strictly proper because )]([)]([ rSEpSE ∗∗ >  for pr ≠  since Tpp  
. As before with any strictly proper scoring rule, S* is positive and independent of r and E
rewards calibration, and in addition, )(/)]()1()()([)( cTcSrcrSrSrS −−−=∗ .  So for 21
well calibrated forecasters, 1)0()1( == SS and additionally ∗∗ 0)( =cS  because ∗
)1()1( 1SS = and )0()0( 2SS = .  The overall average score ∗S  is 
∑ −− )(/)]())( 21 cTcSrcrS . A well calibrated forecaster with a 
distribution g(r) who provides r values approaching zero or one more frequently than 
values approaching c will obtain a greater average score. The asymmetric scoring rule 
−=∗ 1()()[( rSrgS
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 rewards skill whilst providing a measure of the skill when c is considered a benchmark 
probability and skill is considered a capability of being more discriminatory than c.  
An example provided by Winkler (1994) is the consideration of the quadratic rule 
defined by 21 )1(1)( rrS −−= and 22 1)( rrS −= . For this, 
)(/])1()1[()( 221 cTrcrS −−−=∗ and )(/)()( 222 cTrcrS −=∗ where 2)( ccT = if cr ≤ and 
2)1( c− if cr ≥ uadratic function when c, thus using one q r ≤ and a different when cr ≥ . 
For well calibrated forecasters, )(/)()( 2 cTcrrS −=∗ . Figure 6.1 shows )(rS ∗ , )(rS ∗ , 1 2
and )(rS ∗ for the only value in which 
Winkler (1994, p.1399,1400), shows , and 
S* is symmetric, c = 0.5, and figure 6.2, provided by 
)(1 rS
∗ , )(2 rS
∗ )(rS ∗  for c = 0.2. Overall, the 
forecasting skill efficiently and so it is logical to have the sm st value for 
reasoning for having an asymmetric scoring rule is to have the ability to measure 
alle )(rS
when r is the least skilled forecast.  
occur 
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 Sarin and Winkler (1980) are focused on incentive plans and how they can be us
to better motivate managers to forecast accurately and honestly, work harder to achie
ed 
ve the 
goals s
w two types of go sed incentive plans, deterministic and probabilistic. 
Deterministic goal based incentive plans involve rewards that are determined by 
perform
opposed to rewards based solely on the performance of the managers.  Probabilistic goal 
based incentive plans involve decision making and planning when uncertainty is involved 
ers to  
 scoring 
For decision making with uncertainty, the manager should provide a probability 
distribution reflecting his uncertainty of the situation x, denoted x = (x1,…, xn) instead of a 
single point estimate gi of xi for i = 1,…,n. The reported distribution is represented by q(x) 
with Sarin and Winkler simplifying by assuming the distribution to be discrete rather than 
continuous and the marginal distribution of xi is denoted by qi(xi) which is viewed as a 
“probabilistic goal.” Achievement, denoted . The reward for 
probability assessors that encourages honest prob s of 
a scoring rule xxqs and is strictly proper if “it encourages honesty in the sense that 
et forth, and to act on behalf of the company’s best interests. Sarin and Winkler 
(1980) revie al ba
ance in relation to the goals set forth by the managers in the planning process, as 
and that uncertainty is presented in the model with probabilistic terms. Sarin and Winkler 
show how to design an incentive plan encouraging manag  report probabilistic goals
honestly. Here is where scoring rules become a topic of discussion, because using
rules as incentive plans should make it easier to obtain honest reporting of uncertainty 
about performance.  
∗ , corresponds to ia ]),([ iii xxq
ability reporting is expressed in term
]),([ iiii
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 an asse
 a 
ssor’s expected score is maximized by honest reporting” (Sarin & Winkler, 1980 
p.1139). Basically, if ri(xi) represents the managers judgments regarding xi and qi(xi) is the 
managers reported distribution for xi and qi ≡ ri , then the reporting is honest. Therefore
scoring rule si is strictly proper given the managers expected score ∑ (]),([ iiiiii xrxxqs
maximized if q
) is 
 
er 
e decision maker’s evaluation of performan
nagers should not depend on s(q,x).” And second; “if all managers have identical 
x, then the decision maker’s evaluation of performance difference between any 
nagers should not depend on x” (Sarin & Winkler, 1980 p.1139). The theorem 
at the condition is satisfied if and only if )(),(),( xpxqsxqp
i ≡ ri over all possible values of xi.   
Though scoring rules encourage honest reporting they do not motivate managers to 
work harder. To do so, the performance function should depend on ]),([ iiii xxqs and 
)(1 ii xp , a function that represents preferences for values of xi. Therefore the performance 
function pi is a function of qi(xi) and xi through si and p1i and the following condition 
enables the decomposition of pi (note the i subscript is only dropped for convenience). The
condition states first; “if all managers have identical evaluations s(q,x) on a strictly prop
scoring rule s, then th ce difference between any 
two ma
values of 
two ma
declares th 121λ= + λ where 
1λ and 2λ  are scaling constants with 0, 21 >λλ and 121 =+ λλ  and s and p1 are scaled 
between 0 and 1 for their worst and best valu s respectively.  W  to honesty e ith respect
reporting motivation, for this theorem, “any positive linear transformation of s is a strictly 
proper scoring rule, where the coefficient of the transformation may depend upon x but not 
upon q, thus p(q,x)  is a strictly proper scoring rule” (Sarin & Winkler, 1980 p.1139).  
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 The example provided by Sarin and Winkler employs the supposition that x 
represents the subsequent month’s sales in thousands of units, where it is felt that 7.5 ≤ x ≤ 
10.5, and the manager is asked to make a probability assessments for values of x rounded 
to nearest thousand, so that q(x) consists of the manager’s probabili
x = 10, respectively. The decision maker has chosen
ties for x = 8, x = 9, and 
 a quadratic scoring rule, 
10
2 ⎤⎡ 2/1)()(2
8
⎥⎦⎢⎣
+−= ∑),(
=
xqs
d q = (0, 0, 1), and the 
worst p  
y
yqxq and assesses 4/)8()(1 −= xxp .  The best possible 
achievement corresponds to s = 1 and p
2
1 = 1, implying that x = 10 an
ossible achievement corresponds to s = 0 and p1 = 0, implying that x = 8 and q = (0,
0, 1) or (0, 1, 0). For the assessment of 1λ  and 2λ , the manager should assign a 
performance score p to an intermediate achievement, for instance q = (1, 0, 0) and x = 8  
because the level of sales is low but predictably so by the manager, enabling the decision 
maker to plan accordingly. Assessing p[q = (1, 0, 0), x = 8] = 2.0)0()1( 21 =+ λλ , yields 
2.01 =λ , implying that that a high sales level which is assigned a zero probability [e.g., q
= (1, 0, 0), x = 10] should have a 
performance score of 
8.0)1()0( =+
 
21 λλ . Table 6.1, 
ovide by Sarin and Winkler (1980
p.1140), provides some select 
performance scores of the example.  
“Note that for a given q, p increases as 
x increases, while for a given x, p increases as q becomes ‘more accurate’” (Sarin & 
pr d , 
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 Winkle ork, 
The consideration of the action of competition affecting the forecasters reported 
probabilities is covered by Lichtendahl and Winkler (2007).  Lichtendahl and Winkler 
define the situation as; there exists  consultation of tw t the 
probability of E from each, rewarding forecaster i (i = 1, 2) via a score S  from a strictly 
proper scoring rule S that yields S
r, 1980 p.1140).  In order for incentive plans based on probabilistic goals to w
the manager’s performance and the relation of the performance to the reported probabilities 
must be taken into consideration.   
 an event E, a o forecasters to elici
i
iE if E occurs and S )()(β ' iE β if its complement E’ 
event E is denoted by p  and i’s reporting strategy is represented by )( pb
occurs, where βi is forecaster i’s reported probability of E. Forecaster i’s probability for 
i iiiβ = and the 
iβ− and 2( iES β .  
T  
e in rel
Sw ) , where 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 and Ri = 0(0.5)1 if Si <(=)> Sj, j ≠ i (i.e. if 
i’s score is worse t  or better than the score of the other forecaster), and wi 
e-off between relative performance and score.  
ce term does not depend on scoring rule that is used, if E 
βi has the better performance, with Ri = 1 (a tie can 
rm on the right side is specific scoring rule 
scoring rule is normalized so that 0 ≤ Si ≤ 1, where a higher score is better. They use the 
normalized quadratic score for their examples, 1(1)( iES β −= 1) iβ−=
here is an additional assumption that forecaster i’s preferences can be represented
by a utility function that is additiv
iiiii RwSRu 1(),( −+=
han, equal to,
represents forecaster i’s preference trad
Because the relative performan
occurs, the forecaster with the higher 
occur at R
2) '
ative performance Ri and score Si, 
ii
i = 0.5) and only the second te
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 dependent. There are discontinuities associated with the utility function, through the 
relative performance term, that are however justifiable considerations such as career 
concerns (i.e. promotion or maintaining a current position). Nonetheless, the absolute 
performance term is a continuous function of β , and the discontinuity impact is dependent 
on the size of w  which is reflective of the importance of the competition to the forecaster.  
ut 
he con f forec , j ≠ 
 f and
ned can be different.
r hold no 
relevance making her optima
i
i
There are also the forecaster’s conditional beliefs to consider; forecaster i (i = 1,2) 
knows her own probability pi and does not know the probability of the other forecaster, b
has the associated distribution.  T ditional beliefs o aster i about pj (i = 1, 2
i) given pi are represented by continuous cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) ij pEpF ,|
and 
ij pEp
F ,'| , with corresponding probability density functions (pdfs)  ij pEpf ,'| . It 
is to be noted however that the provided distributions are distributions for the reported 
probabilities, not the beliefs, which was determi   
 
ij pEp ,|
A second forecaster who doesn’t care about relative performance has a w2 = 0 thus 
her utility equals her score, meaning that her beliefs about the first forecaste
l strategy the same as if she were the only forecaster under 
evaluation, i.e. truthful reporting; 22 p=β  (Lichtendahl & Winkler, 2007). The followin
proposition shows that truthful reporting is not necessarily the best response to combat 
truthful reporting. The proposition states that “if 0 < w
g 
i <1, 0 < pi < 1, and forecaster 1 
believes that forecaster 2 will report truthfully, truthful reporting satisfies the first-order 
condition to be forecaster 1’s best response if and only if 
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 )1/()(/)( 111,|1,'| 1212 pppfpf pEppEp −= ” (Lichtendahl & Winkler, 2007 p.1747).  The 
example provided by Lichtendahl & Winkler is to use the normalized quadratic scorin
rule already presented and suppose that forecaster 1’s conditional beliefs about p
g 
eta 2 are b
with (c, d, c’, d’) = (2, 1, 1, 2), the first order condition for maximizing expected utility is 
)21/()( wwp −−= 1111β and if p1 and w1 are such that this ]1,0[1 ∉β  or the second order 
condition )012( ≤−iw  does not hold, then the optimal βi is zero or one.  So when w1 < 0.5
β
, 
1 = {0 if ∗<≤ 110 pp  , 011 αα +p  if ∗∗ −≤≤ 111 1 ppp , and 1 if 11 11 ≤<− ∗ pp , where 
)21/(1 w−= 11α , )21/(2/)1( ww 1110 −−=−= αα , and / wp =−=∗ αα . When w1101 1 ≥ 
0.5, reporting extreme values is the best response: β  = {0 if p  < 0.5, 0 or 1 if p  = 0.5, and 
1 if p . Intuitively, this strategy shows that forecaster 1 is willin ray fr r 
beliefs and report higher probabilities in order to stand a better chance of winning the 
competition and is thus making a trade-off between the two terms in h
1 1 1
1 > 0.5 g to st om he
er utility function 
with a larger w1 illing to trade on the score for the 
relative performa
y 
s simu
ty 
,2, the scoring rule is strictly 
 corresponding to how much she is w
nce term.  
Lichtendahl and Winkler (2007) continue this competition theme with game theor
to analyze both forecasters’ decision ltaneously (not as before with only one 
forecaster’s decision based on her beliefs of the second forecaster’s probability and utili
function). Their focus involves each forecaster having the same utility function and the 
same beliefs about the other forecaster’s abilities.  Therefore, each forecaster’s utility 
function is iiiiiii SwRwSRu )1(),( −+=  with wi = w, i =1
 90
 proper, and the cdfs F and F vate 
ij pEp ,| i of each forecaster for the other forecaster’s pri
information are continuous in p
j pEp ,'|
j for 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1, i =1,2, j ≠ i and symmetric in the sense 
that )()( 1,|2,| 2112 pFpF pEppEp = and )()( 1,'|2,'| 2112 pFpF pEppEp = for 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1. The 
following proposition invokes symmetry of utilities and conditional beliefs. The 
 this forecasting game, any strictly increasing, differentiable 
piece of a g Bayesian Nash equilibrium reporting function b(p
pro
nondecreasin
(()1()[1()]()1()([ ' ','|,| −+−+− EiiiipEpiipEpi bsppwpfppfpw ijij ” 
ta 
he 
equation of 
position states that “in
i) must satisfy 
the following differential equation: 
('))]((' =− iiE pbppbs
(Lichtendahl & Winkler, 2007).   
Lichtendahl and Winkler provide an example with a quadratic scoring rule and be
distributions representing the forecaster’s beliefs about their opponent’s beliefs. With t
application of the proposition equation, an ordinary, nonlinear, first-order differential 
0)))
])()[1(2
)]','|()1(),|([
)('
ii
iBeiiBei
i
dcpfpdcpfpw −−
ppbw
pb −−=  is yielded. Now, if (c, d, 
c’, d’) = (2, 1, 1, 2) the equilibrium reporting function, denoted pˆ equilibrium, when w > 
2/3, is of the form )( ipb = {0 if ppi ˆ0 <≤ , 01 αα +ip if ppp i ˆ1ˆ −≤≤ , and 1 if 
1ˆ1 ≤<− ipp where 2/)])1/([811(1 ww −++=α , 2/)1( 12 αα −= , and pˆ =0.2893 is the
root of a quadratic equation, and extreme reporting is noted when w ≥ 2/3. This strategy 
also implies that b(p
 
i) should be closer to the extremes than to pi, with noted jumps at 
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 pˆ and )ˆ1( p− due to arison  expected utilities along the solution to the first 
order differential equation and reporting at the extreme values.  
 using the asymmetric
which presents a scheme of two differential equations (one per forecaster) and dif
reporting functions for the two forecasters. The first example entails the forecasters 
differing in their approach to the importance of the competitive aspect of relative 
performance, therefore w
 comp  of the
  Lichtendahl and Winkler also consider this problem  case 
ferent 
1 = 0.25 and w2 = 0.5, the second forecaster will give 
e reports for intermediate values of p because he put more weight on the 
ance term. The second example modifies the beliefs instead of the weights, 
as in the previous example. This time w1 = w2 = 0.25 and the beliefs about and p2 are beta 
c
 
eat a difference in reporting functions as did the asymm
weights. Lastly, knowing the utility functions and conditional beliefs of the other 
ach o ilities and eferences
1 ≠ w2. If w
more extrem
relative perform
with ( , d, c’, d’) = (1.25, 0.25, 0.25, 1.25) and (2, 1, 1, 2) respectively, showing that the 
conditional distributions of p1 nearly dominate those of p2, almost suggesting that 
forecaster 1 has more expertise.  Overall the two examples suggest that the asymmetric
beliefs did not lead to as gr etric 
forecaster gives the analyst an idea of the manipulation that can occur when forecaster’s 
have an inkling of e thers ab  pr . 
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 CHAPTER 7 Conclusion 
se 
 
  
 
y create 
 can 
n 
 how good the forecaster is), the 
degree of calibration, and if the provided probabilities are coherent.  If the probability 
assessments are determined to be biased, several methods to reduce this bias were 
provided. The assessments can be modified by calibrating them or by internally or 
externally ensuring coherence. The original elicitation process may be redone, possibly 
including a decomposition of the uncertainty into more manageable components. Lastly, 
 
Biased probability assessments can have a significant effect on the prescriptions 
from a decision analysis. Many of the applications that have been discussed herein that u
probability assessments include consequences such as loss of life, health effects, and
environmental impacts. In such cases, minimizing the impact of biases on assessed
probabilities is critical. The goal of the decision analyst should be to provide an analysis 
that is as error free as possible. 
Biased judgments can be made both consciously and unconsciously by both experts 
and non-experts alike.  Heuristics play a key role in how people inject information into the
judged uncertainty and how that uncertainty is projected into usable probabilistic 
quantities.  Biases can and often do arise because of cognitive heuristics which ma
havoc on an analysis. To minimize such problems, elicitation methods have been 
developed that include defining the problem in depth, training the assessor, eliciting the 
probabilities via an interview process, and verifying the results. Such methodology
eliminate most biases associated with the heuristics. Once the assessments are provided a
analyst can determine the reliability of the forecaster (i.e.
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 scoring rules can be used to encourage more honest forecasting.  Moreover, the entire 
elicitation process will provide a reference fo provement of his 
own as in 
ding 
 
ysis when it comes to the subject of probability elicitation. 
There i
ters, 
ination 
ot 
n 
nson, 
ta 
r the expert to aid in the im
sessment ability. The process will also provide a reference for the decision maker 
the determination of the forecaster’s assessment abilities, should the decision maker need 
to call on that expert again for another decision analysis.   
Proper elicitation and improvement methodology has been discussed for extru
unbiased probability assessments, but there remains a great disconnect between the fields
of psychology and decision anal
s an abundance of literature available for the psychological reasoning behind why 
the heuristics are utilized and the associated biases.  There is an abundance of decision 
analysis literature that encompasses probability assessments, calibration of forecas
scoring rules, how to elicit probabilities, etc.  However, there is a lack of literature that 
connects the two subjects together.  Many decision analysis papers discuss the elim
of biases but do not specify which biases their methods are trying to overcome exactly. 
 There are psychology-oriented papers that mention the link to decision analysis but do n
specify what methodology is employed. There is serious lack of connectivity between 
these two areas addressing probability elicitation, the biases associated with it, and the 
methods to overcoming how the biases are introduced. It seems apparent that decision 
analysts and psychologists who are interested in the subject of probability elicitatio
should collaborate to promote research that connects the two areas. Additionally, Be
Curley, and Smith (1995) outline some research opportunities for decision analysis in da
generation, argument construction, and associated judgments. 
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 There are other areas that could benefit from additional research as well.  Each 
improvement scheme; calibration, coherence, and scoring rules, is provided in a theoretica
design but with a lack of proof of improvement. It appears that no (or very limited) studies 
have been performed to determine the exact affect of the methodologies, especially from a
psychological standpoint. In essence, the psychological lite
l 
 
rature stated the biases that can 
be asso
nd 
p 
 
ght 
ring 
uite a bit of research being 
ciated with heuristics, the decision analysts determined that training the subjects 
will overcome the cognitive judgment associated biases, but the psychology research to 
determine if the methods worked has not been performed. Additionally, there seem to be 
methods specific to each improvement concept but not any overarching methods that can 
incorporate multiple problems.  For example, there is one methodology for calibration a
one methodology for dealing with incoherence, but there is not a method that can overla
and involve both problems at once, though both problems are similar in stature.  
Finally, there are many instances that are specific to probability elicitation that can 
be improved upon and many independent methods for accomplishing the improvements.
There is not however, one standard overall process from start to finish that should 
eliminate the biases that are customary to assessing uncertainty. A complete process mi
include using the elicitation methods described in chapter four complete with subject 
training and an all encompassing set up procedure, using decomposition to minimize 
complexity, eliciting the assessments via the P and V methods with the addition of sco
rules to encourage honesty, verifying the assessments and checking for miscalibration and 
incoherence, and finally either repeating the process or manipulating the assessments 
should any biased assessments be produced. Overall, there is q
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 done in ars dependently on each subject specific to probability elicitation. However, it appe
that little research is being conducted on the overlapping concepts between psychology and 
decision analysis and also amongst the associated problems and the connectivity involving 
the improvement methodologies. 
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